

JPRS-SEA-85-035

20 FEBRUARY 1985

Southeast Asia Report

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

20 February 1985

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INDONESIA

Minister Reaffirms Indonesia Not Secular State (HARIAN UMUM AB, 13 Nov 84)	1
Differing Views on Progress of Government Development Projects (KOMPAS, 14, 15 Nov 84)	2
Problems in the Execution of Government Projects Development Budget Being Implemented Smoothly	
FRETILIN Leader on Continuing Struggle for Independence (Roque Rodrigues Interview; NO PINTCHA, 12 Jan 85)	6
Trade Attache to Iran To Be Nominated Shortly (MERDEKA, 13 Nov 84)	10
BULOG Chief Clarifies Rice Import From DPRK (KOMPAS, MERDEKA, 14 Nov 84)	11
Rice Imports From North Korea Under Old Contract Agriculture Minister's Denial	
Fertilizer Subsidies, Rice Imports Discussed (KOMPAS, 11 Dec 84)	14
PERTAMINA's Plans for 1984-89 Described (KOMPAS, 11 Dec 84)	16
Problems With Smallholder Estate Projects Described (KOMPAS, 11 Dec 84)	18
Gloomy Future Predicted for Textile Industry (KOMPAS, 11 Dec 84)	20
State Run Sugarcane Plantation Losses Noted (KOMPAS, 12 Dec 84)	23

One-Stop Service Planned for Regional Capital Investment (KOMPAS, 13 Dec 84)	25
Profits of PT Nurtanio, PT PAL Reported (KOMPAS, 14 Dec 84)	27
LAOS	
'Letters' Column Focuses on Border Dispute (PASASON, 28 Dec 84)	28
Column Sees Need for Public Security, Military Mobilization (PASASON, 28 Dec 84)	31
PHILIPPINES	
Ramos Initiates 4 January 85 PC-INP Reassignments (BULLETIN TODAY, 5 Jan 85)	32
Witnesses Disappear in Samar Case Against Clerics (BULLETIN TODAY, 5 Jan 85)	34
New NDF 12-Point Program Reported - (VISAYAN HERALD, 5 Jan 85)	35
Text of Convenor Group 'Declaration of Unity' (VERITAS, 6 Jan 85)	37
VERITAS Profiles Growing Role of Leftist Youth Movement (VERITAS, 6 Jan 85)	42
'Martial Law Babies' Lead Confrontations, by Ma. Theresa R. Martelino Three Leaders Profiled, by Gig! S. Oyog Education Minister Dismisses Student Role, by Patty L. Adversario Recollections of Activist-Turned-Rebel, by Pennie S. Azarcon KBL Youth Group Inactive, by Jesselynn Garcia de la Cruz	
RUC8 Commander Predicts Major NPA Offensive (ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 5 Jan 85)	53
Ramos Cites Atrocities, Claims NPA Recruiting Thugs (BULLETIN TODAY, 6 Jan 85)	54
Reportage on NPA Encounters in Mindanao (Various sources, various dates)	56
17 Killed in Misamis Incidents, by Proc Maslog Troopers Slay 8 NPA Suspects	
Unknown Gunman Kills 'Christian' BMA Rebel (THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR, 6 Jan 85)	58

Army-MNLF Firefight Kills 12 in North Cotabato (Hernani Pastolero; PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM, 6 Jan 85)	60
Report on MALAYA Writer's Plea for Handgun Rights (Ed Fernandez; PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM, 6 Jan 85)	61
Mt Diwata Gold Camp Situation Profiled (T. R. Lansner; THE WEST AUSTRALIAN, 28 Dec 84)	62
KMU Urges Bank To Pay Laid Off Auto Workers (ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 5 Jan 85)	65
Lack of Raw Materials Closes Over 2,000 Firms in 1984 (Ellen Samaniego; PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 6 Jan 85) ...	66

THAILAND

Columnist on SRV Charges of U.S., Thai, PRC Subversion (Udon Wongthapthim; DAILY NEWS, 18 Dec 84)	68
Cartoon on Human Rights, Anti-Communist Law (WIWAT, 15-21 Dec 84)	70
Columnist Urges Leniency for Communist Suspects (Withayakon Chaingkun; MATICHON, 15 Dec 84)	71
ISOC Sources on New Northeast Communist Movement (CHAT ATHIPATAI, 16-22 Dec 84)	73
Police, Mobsters Cooperate in Surat Thani, Mukdahan (MATICHON, 21 Dec 84)	76
Further Reports on Crown Prince, Prem Meeting (LAK THAI, 27 Dec 84)	79
Economist: Devaluation, Mill Owners Hurt Farmers (Choemsak Pinthong; MATICHON, 21 Dec 84)	80

VIETNAM

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

3rd Military Region General on Recent Economic, Defense Efforts (Nguyen Quyet; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 10 Oct 84)	84
Ways To Strengthen National Defense in Localities Proposed (Vu Van; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 26 Nov 84)	91
Ways To Improve Teaching of Tradition (Do Cong Cuong; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Nov 84)	96

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

Localities' Market Management Efforts Seen Improved (NHAN DAN, 6 Dec 84)	104
---	-----

Ha Bac Takes Steps To Control Cigarette Market (Xuan Cuong; NHAN DAN, 6 Dec 84)	106
--	-----

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

Quality, Location of Iron Ore Deposits Outlined (Hoang Linh; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 10 Dec 84)	109
---	-----

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities	111
---	-----

Information on Vietnamese Personalities	117
---	-----

PUBLICATIONS

Table of Contents of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, No 11, 1984 ...	121
---	-----

INDONESIA

MINISTER REAFFIRMS INDONESIA NOT SECULAR STATE

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 13 Nov 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Jakarta, HARIAN UMUM AB--Minister of Religion Munawir Sjadzali has declared that in Indonesia there has never been religious oppression such as that experienced by immigrants who left Europe for the United States. He stated: "Oppression has never taken place here in a broad sense, in small incidents in which a government leader of one religion oppressed the people, who were of another religion."

The minister of religion made this statement on 12 November when he was opening the 37th course for mass organizations on the promotion and implementation of the Pancasila [Five Principles of the Nation] at the Central BP-7 [Body for the Promotion of the Pancasila] on Jalan Pejambon in Jakarta. The course, which will last until 27 November, is attended by 189 participants from 47 mass organizations.

Specifically during the history of the struggle for independence of the Indonesian people, religion has been a driving force in our own efforts. We have never had religious groups or leaders who were supporters of the colonial government or governments which were opposed to the independence struggle.

Indeed, if we review our history, we can see that many religious leaders emerged as fighters for our nation. The late Sukarni once said that in Indonesia religion was a specific driving force of the revolution.

The minister of religion reemphasized that Indonesia is not a secular state. Secularism in a practical political sense means the rejection of state or government interference in the religious life of citizens.

It can be seen that Indonesia is not a secular state from the fact that 6 months after the proclamation of independence Indonesia established the Department of Religion. This meant that the government participated in directing and developing the religious life of the people. However, the government did this without becoming involved in the beliefs and convictions of the various religions.

According to Minister Sjadzali, in a world situation in which many countries prohibit religious activity and where there are also religious activities which are in opposition to the state, the Indonesian Government has clearly committed itself on the role of religion in national life. This can be seen in the GBHN [Main Lines of State Policy] document adopted by the government.

Therefore, essentially all government programs contained in the various 5-year plans have aimed at nothing less than explaining the teachings of religion.

INDONESIA

DIFFERING VIEWS ON PROGRESS OF GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Problems in the Execution of Government Projects

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 14 Nov 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--The faulty implementation of government projects is the main cause of the sluggishness in the business world at present. The government budget, which finances government projects, controls more than 70 percent of Indonesian economic activity. As a result, if government outlay is not handled efficiently, economic activity will also encounter obstacles.

Sukandani Sahid Gitosardjono, general chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN), made the foregoing statement to a KOMPAS representative. He said on 13 November that the faulty implementation of government projects is due to the fact that this fiscal year is the first year of the Fourth 5-Year Plan. There are many new budgetary allocations which still must be reconsidered, and taking care of this requires more time.

Sukandani said: "In addition to that, during this first year of the Fourth 5-Year plan project leaders are being chosen who are really qualified. They must be honest, live in the area of the project, and be in a position to control their project from the technical point of view." Last week Sukandani met with President Soeharto at his residence on Jalan Cendana in Jakarta. One subject which they discussed at the time was the matter of the sluggishness of the business world and the reasons for delays in the implementation of government projects.

H. Hamzah Haz, deputy chairman of the Budget Committee of Parliament from the Development Unity Faction, in a separate statement declared that the government was acting too cautiously in implementing its development program, with the result that the funds actually disbursed moved very slowly into the economy. The government is trying to hold down inflation, but as a result it is holding down economic growth.

Hamzah said: "The National Development Planning Board does not appear to be fully in control of economic activity, so that actual results are far short of what was planned. This has resulted in growing amounts of unspent, budgeted funds."

25 Percent

Hamzah Haz said that, based on his observations and reports from the provinces, it turns out that through the first 6 months of fiscal year 1984-85 government expenditures amounted to only about 25 percent of budgeted funds. This resulted in very weak economic activity.

He said: "With economic activity so weak, no economic impact is felt. This will influence economic growth. In this connection, during the Fourth 5-Year Plan every year the growth rate should be 5 percent, on the average."

It is specifically during the first years of the Fourth 5-Year Plan that a high level of economic growth should be achieved. If economic growth is slow at the beginning, it is feared that in the following years it will be even slower.

In addition, if total expenditure is only 25 percent of the budget in the first 6 months of the fiscal year, this means that the total amount of unspent funds by the end of the year will be even larger. Whereas during fiscal year 1983-84 total unexpended funds amounted to 36.7 percent, during 1984-85 it is expected that the level of unexpended funds will be above 40 percent. If this happens, the problems will really be serious, because this proves that in practice government economic activity is not going well.

Why is the development program progressing unevenly? According to Hamzah Haz, this is because of the problems which usually come up, involving land, project design, and project cost. This shows that the government is not in control of its program. This particularly affects the National Development Planning Board as the planning authority, which should get out into the field more often and get to know what the situation really is. When the board makes its plans, it should really be possible to carry them out.

However, Hamzah feels that the cause is not routine problems, because the government has had years of experience. There may be other factors involved.

Is the government short of funds? Hamzah Haz did not believe that this was true, because if the government is really short of funds, it certainly would report this to Parliament so that additional funds could be made available. However, up to the present the government has never said it was short of funds. Certainly, there are ample funds available.

'Check Into That Project'

Sukamdani said that the faulty implementation of development projects is due to the fact that this fiscal year is the first year of the Fourth 5-Year Plan. This year there are many types of expenditures which remain to be reviewed, even though they have been approved. The term used is: "Check into that project."

Therefore, the general chairman of KADIN said, more time than normal will be needed for several types of budgetary expenditures. Although in prior years we only needed about 3 months to make the necessary preparations, now it may take up to 6 months. As a result, if the process of starting up the project begins in July, it may be November before work actually gets under way.

He said: "Therefore, maximum activity may only take place at the beginning of the following year." He admitted that the faulty implementation of government projects was a cause of sluggish business conditions because government project activity has major impact in terms of national economic activity.

However, he said that it is hoped that the practice of "looking into" a given project will end and project implementation will once again proceed normally.

Another factor is the government effort to improve project leadership. Now there is careful selection of project leaders. Those chosen must fulfill conditions of honesty, live near the project, and themselves possess technical knowledge applicable to the project.

He added: "Once the selection of project leaders is complete, then there should be no more problems. In addition, mistakes can be avoided to a large extent."

Development Budget Being Implemented Smoothly

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 15 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--It is estimated that 40.5 percent of the development expenditures for all of fiscal year 1984-85 will have been spent during the first 6 months of the year. It is also hoped that 45.8 percent of domestic receipts of funds to cover expenditures will have been received. Receipts for development expenditures at this point are still low: about 26 percent. Routine expenditures are at the 42.5 percent level.

This information was contained in a government report on the implementation of the budget and price, credit, and foreign exchange developments for the first half of fiscal year 1984-85.

On the whole the government report indicates that the implementation of the budget this year has not encountered many obstacles. Everything appears to be going well, and it is stated that by the end of the fiscal year it is estimated that funds expended will have reached the totals set out in the 1984-85 budget, which was balanced at 20,560,400,000 rupiahs.

Actual development expenditures for the first half of the fiscal year show that the implementation of government development projects has gone rather well. The view that the Indonesian business world at present is rather sluggish because of faulty implementation of government development projects is not true.

Compared with the same period in the previous fiscal year, 1983-84, the percentage of funds actually spent in the first half of the present fiscal year is lower, but the difference is not particularly great. During the first half of fiscal year 1983-84 expenditures amounted to 47 percent of the total, while expenditures during the first half of fiscal year 1982-83 were about the same as in the current fiscal year, or about 41.5 percent of the total.

Estimated development expenditures during the first half of fiscal year 1984-85 amount to 4,244,503,000,000 rupiahs. Development expenditures in rupiahs amounted to 3,111,657,000,000 rupiahs, and project aid amounted to 1,132,846,000 rupiahs.

The percentage of actual expenditures was 3.4 percent lower than actual expenditures during the same period of the previous fiscal year. The development budget consists of various development expenditures and project aid financed from foreign sources.

Development expenditures include the costs of the projects handled by government departments and institutions, including projects of the Department of Defense and Security. In addition, they include development assistance provided to the provinces, particularly in the form of programs coming under presidential instructions. During the first half of this fiscal year actual expenditures amounted to 55.7 percent of budgeted funds.

Other development expenditures include subsidies on fertilizer, the investment of government capital, and other categories. During the first half of this fiscal year contributions of government capital amounted to 260,549,999,000 rupiahs, including government contributions to the capital of PT DOK Perkapalan Tanjung Priok [Tanjung Priok Shipbuilding Yard], PT GIA/Cengkareng [Garuda Indonesian Airlines and the Cengkareng International Airport], the Musi River Petroleum Refinery Project, PT PINDAP [Army Industrial Company], PT Industri Mesin Produksi Indonesia (IMPI) [Indonesian Machinery Production Company], and PT PAL Indonesia [Indonesian Shipbuilding Yard in Surabaya].

Under project aid, development expenditures in this category during the first half of fiscal year 1984-85 are expected to amount to 1,132,846,000,000 rupiahs. This involves the implementation of foreign aid commitments for fiscal year 1984-85 and previous years. Among other things these expenditures involve financing development projects in the sectors of mining and energy, communications and tourism, agriculture and irrigation, education, and development of the business world.

Based on actual expenditures during the first half of the fiscal year, the government is convinced that by the time the fiscal year ends total budgetary expenditures will be in accordance with what was planned for fiscal year 1984-85.

Domestic Receipts

Domestic budgetary receipts for the first half of fiscal year 1984-85 are estimated at 7,390,612,000,000 rupiahs or 45.8 percent of total anticipated budgetary receipts during the fiscal year. Such large receipts prove that the government is encountering no difficulties.

Therefore, the view that the government is encountering difficulties in collecting domestic revenues is not true, particularly due to the implementation of the new tax law, as well as the delay in the application of the PPN tax [value added tax] on goods and services as well as the sales tax on luxury articles.

INDONESIA

FRETILIN LEADER ON CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Maputo NO PINTCHA in Portuguese 12 Jan 85 pp 4-5

[Report on interview with Roque Rodrigues, member of the Political Bureau of the Revolutionary Front for East Timor Independence (FRETILIN), by NO PINTCHA, in Bissau, date not supplied]

[Text] In a recent interview with NO PINTCHA, Comrade Roque Rodrigues, member of the FRETILIN Political Bureau, talked about the current status of the struggle which the Maubere people have been waging for almost 10 years against Indonesia's invasion and attempted annexation of their territory. After several failed attempts to destroy FRETILIN's political leadership, and recognizing that it is impossible to liquidate FRETILIN by armed force, Indonesia has resumed its psychological campaign to win "hearts and minds," in an attempt to set Timorese against Timorese.

The enemy continues to use and abuse its airpower. It pounds and punishes FRETILIN positions from first daylight to sunset. This has created a tragic situation with respect to food production.

Along with the pursuit of the armed struggle to resist the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, at the international level FRETILIN has been conducting intensive diplomatic activity, primarily among the countries and forces which have supported Djakarta's project for annexation and colonial expansion.

To resolve the issue of East Timor and the conquest of national sovereignty for the Maubere people, Comrade Rodrigues also referred to the peace plan presented by FRETILIN, to be carried out under the aegis of the United Nations.

The plan is within the framework of the policy of national unity which the FRETILIN leaders have been pursuing, considering it a basic issue in its war for liberation.

Portugal Could Help Isolate Indonesia

Roque Rodrigues, member of the FRETILIN Political Bureau, told NO PINTCHA that Portugal, in collaboration with FRETILIN and the five African countries in which Portuguese is the official language, could formulate and outline a series of diplomatic initiatives which would gradually isolate Indonesia.

In this regard, the Maubere leader (who is in Bissau to attend the International Conference honoring Amilcar Cabral) said that if more were known about the East Timor issue, about the "dimensions and the heroism of the Maubere people's struggle for liberation, it would be possible to reach a political, peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict, based on respect for the sacred rights of the people of East Timor to self-determination and national independence."

Also regarding the diplomatic offensive, Comrade Rodrigues pointed to the need to intensify the joint work of the "Five," "who have demonstrated their friendship; they are in fact the strategic and secure rearguard of the Maubere people, led by FRETILIN, in their battle to free their country."

The FRETILIN leader also sees Portugal as very valuable, "because we have no dispute with the Portuguese state, much less with the Portuguese people, with whom we have historic ties. We feel, however, that Portugal has a great moral, legal, juridical and political responsibility with regard to the East Timor problem."

According to Roque Rodrigues, all the organs of political power have a responsibility to take action on behalf of the East Timor people's right to self-determination.

Although he gives credit to Gen Ramalho Eanes, president of the Portuguese republic, who continues to voice his support for the just cause of the Maubere people, "this action has not been followed up by the government. We lament that the Portuguese Government has not taken a clear stand on the East Timor issue.

"It is precisely because of Portugal's failure to provide diplomatic support to East Timor that we have been forced to accept postponement of the debate on the East Timor situation in the United Nations," our interviewee added.

According to Rodrigues, there are reports that members of the Portuguese Government have been negotiating secretly with Indonesian representatives in the United Nations. "It is cause for concern, and we feel that Portugal is betraying us and is not respecting the constitutional obligations by which it is bound as a state. The Portuguese constitution states clearly that the sovereign organs, specifically the president of the republic and the government, should work together to arrive at a means to bring about the Maubere people's right to independence."

Important Role for Australia

The FRETILIN leaders consider Australia to be an important country, a regional power in an area filled with unrest, turmoil and conflict, but one which could "play an important role in relation to the struggle in East Timor.

They feel there is some division in Australia regarding East Timor. It is known that from 1942 to 1945, East Timor was occupied by the Japanese, whose major purpose was to make East Timor a base to attack and invade Australia. This project resulted in a guerrilla war which spread throughout the territory and which finally frustrated Japan's goal of conquering Australia. "In this light, as we see it, Australia should take a more active role, favoring a peaceful solution

to the conflict in East Timor, taking into consideration our people's sacred rights to self-determination and national independence and the preservation of their national identity and cultural individuality."

Recently, FRETILIN delegations have visited Australia and met with authorities there, specifically the Labor prime minister, the foreign affairs minister and other leaders, members of parliament and the Australian clergy.

The Labor Party Congress approved a solution which does not recognize East Timor's annexation by Indonesia, but the true self--determination of East Timor. In the same resolution, the Australian party considered it important to foster initiatives for a political, peaceful and negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Comrade Roque Rodrigues further noted that efforts have been redoubled among the progressive and democratic forces, particularly in the United States, by Comrade Ramos Horta, the FRETILIN representative at the United Nations.

"As a result of these efforts," he continued, "123 members of the U.S. Congress presented a letter to President Reagan, calling attention to the tragic situation of the people of East Timor. The letter was also delivered to Secretary of State George Shultz, who forwarded it to the Indonesian foreign affairs minister."

The letter expresses the concern of important political sectors in the United States regarding the need to find a negotiated solution which will protect the interests of the Maubere people and of the countries in the area, specifically the interests of peace and security.

Peace Depends on Solution of Conflict

"As a liberation movement, FRETILIN considers itself to be a full member of the great family of peace-loving and progressive forces of the world. Therefore, we wish to join our efforts--and our war has this aim--to the efforts of all the peace-loving forces in the search for peace. In our area, peace necessarily depends on the settlement of the East Timor conflict," explained the FRETILIN official. Rodrigues also pointed out that neither FRETILIN nor Indonesia was in a position to impose any kind of military solution. The political settlement is "the only viable solution to the conflict. "We are prepared to hold discussions with Indonesia without any prior conditions. We would then like to see our church act as mediator, since it is nationalist and patriotic and is aware of the anxiety of our people, their suffering and their aspirations."

Regarding the settlement of the problem, which should be supervised by the United Nations, our interviewee said that UN representatives had already spoken with Indonesia and with Portugal. "In our understanding, they have not talked with the most important party to the conflict--the Maubere people. We ask that UN representatives or their special envoys go to East Timor and talk to those who are actually directing the Maubere people's armed struggle of national resistance, the Political Directorate of FRETILIN. Unless FRETILIN is heard, it will be impossible to arrive at peace in East Timor."

FRETILIN is prepared to accept a unilateral cease-fire, to make it possible to receive the UN envoys. Rodrigues stressed: "We would like this delegation to remain for us for a while, to observe how we are conducting the war and to see the genocide which Indonesia has been waging against the Maubere people, and to inform the world. If we establish this cease-fire, we would like the UN forces to guarantee the peace in East Timor."

Multi-party Regime Acceptable

FRETILIN would then agree to elections in East Timor, organized and supervised by the United Nations. "The party or parties to be formed in East Timor, in addition to FRETILIN, would compete in elections if they wished. FRETILIN is perfectly agreeable to this. The corollary to all this is that we are prepared to accept a multi-party parliament, contrary to reports that have been circulated."

According to the East Timor official, Pope John Paul II recently voiced his concern about the situation in the Maubere people's country, particularly when the Indonesian ambassador to the Vatican was presenting his credentials. "This is a very important decision."

Moreover, Rodrigues considers the position of the Portuguese episcopate as encouraging, since it recognizes its responsibility in the creation of Timorese nationalism itself. "There is a combination of forces here that could take a stand."

6362

CSO: 3442/163

INDONESIA

TRADE ATTACHE TO IRAN TO BE NOMINATED SHORTLY

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 13 Nov 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] Jakarta, 12 November--The Department of Trade will appoint a commercial attache to Iran in the near future. Minister of Trade Rachmat Saleh made this statement to reporters on 12 November after witnessing the signature of a contract for the purchase of 30,000 tons of SIR-20 [Standard Indonesian Rubber, Grade 20] rubber between Indonesia and North Korea at the Department of Trade building in Jakarta.

The minister declared that the appointment of a commercial attache had been made possible after an Indonesian trade mission visited Iran not long ago. The purpose of the mission was to consider the possibility of trade between the two countries. While the mission was in Iran, information on the ability of Indonesia to supply its products was made available on a broad basis in order to achieve optimum results.

Minister Rachmat Saleh said: "Iran, with a total population of 40 million people, continues to be a potential market for Indonesian goods in the Middle East area. Its potential is rather large. Indeed, with the war going on against Iraq Iranian imports are still substantial."

During his working visit to Iran and the United Arab Emirates Minister Rachmat Saleh, as the leader of the trade mission, was received by the chairman of Parliament, the prime minister, and the minister of trade of Iran. As a result, the Iranian Government agreed to buy Indonesian rubber and plywood as part of its short-term program.

Center in Dubai

He said that Indonesian trade with the Middle East and Africa has rather good prospects for the future, although its volume with the respective countries of destination is still relatively small.

Minister Rachmat Saleh said: "This situation has led the government to establish a strategically placed trade center to meet the needs of the various countries in the Middle East and Africa. On the basis of a survey Dubai was chosen as a center for the storage of Indonesian products which will be shipped to various countries of destination in the two areas mentioned previously."

INDONESIA

BULOG CHIEF CLARIFIES RICE IMPORT FROM DPRK

Rice Imports from North Korea Under Old Contract

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 14 Nov 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Master of Laws Bustanil Arifin, chief of the Bureau of Logistical Affairs (BULOG), has confirmed the fact that imported rice was still coming into Indonesia during the first half of 1984. However, these imports were under purchase contracts let in fiscal year 1983-84.

Bustanil, who is also minister of cooperatives, said: "So that there will be no misunderstandings, that was under old purchase contracts. At present we are trying to export rice."

Based on figures from the Central Statistical Office (BPS), it appears that during the first half of 1984 Indonesia imported rice worth \$10,279,000 from North Korea. Some circles have been surprised to learn of this development, because for some time now the government has been saying that Indonesia has achieved a surplus in rice.

According to Bustanil, because it was not believed that rice production in 1984 would increase substantially, during fiscal year 1983-84 BULOG planned to import 500,000 tons of rice. This import plan was included in the BULOG budget.

The figure of 500,000 tons was very low, compared with imports of rice in prior years, which always amounted to more than 1 million tons. Bustanil added: "However, we didn't actually import all of the 500,000 tons."

He added that, based on the 1983-84 budget, BULOG had entered into contracts for the purchase of rice from several countries: Pakistan, Burma, and North Korea, each for 30,000 tons, and 200,000 tons from Taiwan.

Sold to Africa

According to the chief of BULOG, the import of the rice under these purchase contracts was carried out on a phased basis, with the last of the imports taking place in February-March 1984. The reason was that Indonesia itself really had enough rice. He said: "It was only because we had these contracts that we brought in this rice."

However, not all of the rice for which there were purchase contracts entered Indonesia. For example, there was a contract with Taiwan for the purchase of about 200,000 tons of rice. However, only 61,000 tons were imported. Of the remaining 139,000 tons some rice was directly exported from Taiwan to other countries, while some of the rice was not, in fact, purchased. He said: "We bought 100,000 of the remaining 139,000 tons of rice. That was not imported into Indonesia but was later sold and exported directly to Africa and Bangladesh."

Meanwhile all of the rice purchased from Pakistan, Burma, and North Korea was imported into Indonesia. On an overall basis rice imports during fiscal year 1983-84 totaled 151,000 tons.

Asked whether BULOG will import more rice during the current fiscal year, Bustanil replied: "No!" Domestic rice production from March to August 1984 was rather high -- far above estimated levels. Meanwhile, the BULOG rice reserve at present stands at 3 million tons, including imported rice. He added: "So what we imported, based on contracts let in the last fiscal year, has not yet been placed on the market."

On the other hand what BULOG is now doing is seeking export markets, offering rice to a number of countries facing rice shortages, such as the Philippines and India, as well as several African countries.

Doesn't Understand

Bustanil told the press he did not understand where the BPS could have obtained the information that Indonesian imports of rice from North Korea amounted to \$10,279,000. He said: "Based on our calculations we imported a little more than \$8 million" worth of rice.

He said that the contract for the purchase of rice from North Korea was signed in September 1983, providing for imports of 30,000 tons. In the contract it was mentioned that there was a 10 percent variation factor, and the rice shipped in February and March amounted to 33,000 tons.

The same considerations applied to the other countries selling rice to Indonesia. BULOG agreed on a price of \$245 per ton. He said: "Therefore, the North Korean rice only amounted to a little over \$8 million. I can't understand where the BPS got that figure of \$10 million." When the press asked for further details, he added: "Perhaps it's just that the BPS was mistaken."

Originally, it was not planned that in fiscal year 1983-84 Indonesia would purchase rice from North Korea. This is because experience had proved the North Korean rice had a high moisture content of up to 14.5 percent. Rice was once purchased from North Korea in 1980 but in the three following years, up to 1983, rice was obtained from other countries.

He stated: "However, the North Koreans repeatedly came to us, asking us to buy their rice. They offered 100,000 tons. We turned them down, but they came back again. Finally, we agreed to buy 30,000 tons." In the purchase agreement Indonesia laid down several conditions, including a provision that the moisture content should not exceed 14 percent; that the price should be the same as contracts with

other countries--that is, \$245 a ton on a C & F [Cost and Freight] basis; and that the transportation should be in Indonesian ships. Bustanil said: "Because the transportation was to be in Indonesian ships, that meant that the shipments would be delayed. The North Koreans had previously tried to arrange for shipment to be made in their own ship."

Never Thought So

Meanwhile, Engr Achmad Affandi, minister of agriculture, said he had never thought that there would be rice imports in 1984. Answering press questions after being received by President Soeharto at his residence on Jalan Cendana, he said: "Basically, there were to be no imports of rice in 1984. Ask BULOG whether they have imported rice or not. However, the practice has been that if they want to import rice, they should coordinate arrangements with us."

He said that the production of rice in 1984 had reached 25 million tons. Meanwhile, the reserves stand at 3.3 million tons, and this is considered a safe level for national consumption.

Agriculture Minister's Denial

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 14 Nov 84 pp 1, 12

[Text] Jakarta, 13 November--Minister of Agriculture Affandi denied that Indonesia was importing rice from North Korea this year worth 11 billion rupiahs. He made this statement after meeting with the president on 13 November to report on preparations for the presentation of the draft fishing bill to Parliament.

He said: "I never thought of importing rice in 1984, and I am convinced that there have been no such imports."

He added: "When we asked BULOG about rice imports, we were told there were none."

However, based on data from the BPS, it appears that Indonesian rice imports during the period from January to June 1984 amounted to 321,500 tons worth \$104 million. This amounts to about 1.3 percent of the estimated Indonesian production of rice in 1984, which should amount to 24.7 million tons.

This import total includes rice imported from North Korea amounting to 33,000 tons worth about 11 billion rupiahs.

According to Minister Affandi, Indonesian rice production this year amounted to 25 million tons, and present reserve stocks amount to about 3.3 million tons.

Although the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations) has determined that food reserves should be about 18 percent of total production, according to the minister of agriculture food reserves of only 12 percent of production are adequate.

5170

CSO: 4213/81

INDONESIA

FERTILIZER SUBSIDIES, RICE IMPORTS DISCUSSED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 84 p 2

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Government subsidies for the prices of fertilizer and pesticide are still great. Subsidies for the two agricultural support commodities in 1984-85 total more than 758.1 billion rupiahs, consisting of 643.4 billion rupiahs for fertilizer and 114.7 billion rupiahs for pesticide.

Engr Wardoyo, junior minister for food production, supplied these figures to members of the DPR Budget Commission in a working meeting at Senayan on Monday [10 December]. The meeting was chaired by Deputy Commission Chairman Benjamin Paulus Messakh SE [master of economics].

Fertilizer subsidies for food crops and other agricultural subsectors total 643.4 billion rupiahs for more than 4.4 million tons of fertilizer, which is a subsidy of 144 rupiahs for each kilogram of fertilizer. Thus, at the price of 90 rupiahs per kilogram (before the increase to 100 rupiahs), the actual cost of fertilizer was 234 rupiahs per kilogram.

More than 4 million tons of the fertilizer used in Indonesia came from domestic production, whereas the remaining .4 million tons were imported. Imports cost 2.33 rupiahs per kilogram more than domestically produced fertilizer.

The 114.7 million rupiahs in pesticide subsidy and the volume of pesticide were not detailed further. The increase in the price of fertilizer by 10 rupiahs per kilogram will somewhat reduce the government's subsidy. In 1985-86, when estimated fertilizer use will reach 4.8 million tons, the government will thereby save about 48 billion rupiahs.

Food Imports

The Budget Commission asked about the considerably increased production of rice in connection with the fact that it still does not meet the demands of Indonesia's people. The government still imports rice from North Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan and Thailand, among others.

Wardoyo said that the government has continued to import rice since the inception of REPELITA [5-year development plan]. In 1978-79, imports were

1,277,000 tons, followed by an increase to 2,606,000 tons (1979-80), then 1,196,100 tons (1980-81), 437,100 tons (1981-82), 507,700 tons (1982-83), and another increase to 1,114,600 tons (1983-84).

Minister Wardoyo stated that rice imports have continued because estimated rice demand through 1985 exceeds production targets. But in succeeding years, in PELITA [5-year development plan] IV, production will match demand.

Considering rice production realized in 1984, when production exceeded demand, there is actually no further need for imports. In fact, it is hoped that exports will be possible. Nevertheless, he said, rice imports are continuing in order to protect good relations with friendly countries.

6942

CS0: 4213/115

INDONESIA

PERTAMINA'S PLANS FOR 1984-89 DESCRIBED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 84 p 2

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--The job of PERTAMINA [National Oil and Natural Gas Company] is becoming harder. This is especially true of the oil marketing sector, which is affected by the still uncertain world economic situation.

"But whatever happens, PERTAMINA cannot sit still, waiting for the international economic situation to improve," said Drs Indra Kartasasmita, director of PERTAMINA shipping and telecommunications, at a flag ceremony in Jakarta on Monday [10 December] commemorating the 27th anniversary of PERTAMINA.

Drs Indra Kartasasmita is serving as acting principal director of PERTAMINA while A. R. Ramly is in the United States on a tour to become more familiar with Indonesian oil markets. Ramly is expected to be abroad until the end of the year. After the United States, he will go to Europe to attend a routine meeting of OPEC.

Introspection

The acting principal director said the purpose of commemorating the anniversary is introspection, so that today will be better than yesterday and tomorrow will be better than today.

PERTAMINA has made much progress in 27 years, and many challenges and difficulties have been met and overcome.

"Leaders have changed, and many workers have left PERTAMINA. Equipment and facilities have undergone change and renewal. But the company keeps on moving, erect and advancing," he said.

Indra Kartasasmita stated his confidence that every PERTAMINA employee will develop innovation and initiative to overcome the current difficult situation. They will engage in consolidation, hard work and improvement for the success of national development.

1984-89

He stated that steps to be taken for the success of national development are included in the company's plan for 1984-89.

Through exploration and production, PERTAMINA will seek new reserves that will at least maintain the potential level of oil production at 1.6 million barrels per day and natural gas at 5.4 billion cubic feet per day. To achieve this, PERTAMINA and its contractors must make seismic exploration of an average of 67,500 square kilometers per year and must bore an average of 250 wells per year.

Geothermal exploration will be improved in support of the government's program to conserve energy.

Oil refining will also be expanded as part of the effort to achieve self-sufficiency in petroleum and nonpetroleum fuels and to produce refined products for export. For that purpose, better management capabilities are needed to handle refining that is more complex than in the past.

Construction has begun on LPG [liquefied petroleum gas] export facilities at Tanjung Uban for the purpose of expanding the export potential and competitiveness of LPG. The project will produce as much gas as the market demands and will accommodate special LPG tankers.

Value Added to Gas

At Bunyu, East Kalimantan, PERTAMINA is also building a methanol refinery with a production capacity of 1,000 tons per day. One of the purposes of this project is to increase the value added to gas that accompanies oil. Such gas was previously burned in the fields. It is hoped that the refinery will be in operation by the middle of 1985.

PERTAMINA is also building the Aromatic Center at Plaju, South Sumatra, for increasing the value added to the naphtha that has long been produced. Plans call for the Aromatic Center to be in production in 1986. Its production will meet domestic needs as well as provide exports.

In expanding the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market, 2 million tons of LNG will be exported to South Korea each year beginning in 1986. An LNG production unit (train) is now being built at Arun for this purpose.

To meet the domestic demand for asphalt, PERTAMINA is renovating existing asphalt refining facilities, and to ensure the smooth distribution of BBM [petroleum fuel] PERTAMINA is maintaining old facilities and adding new ones. These include facilities for storage, transportation and distribution.

The shipping sector has an important function in delivering BBM throughout Indonesia. As demands for BBM increase, assurance is needed for dependable, inexpensive shipping to all parts of the country.

"To support the success of these activities, there are plans to improve the welfare of employees while they are still actively at work as well as during their old age," said Indra.

INDONESIA

PROBLEMS WITH SMALLHOLDER ESTATE PROJECTS DESCRIBED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS—Most of the PIR (smallholder nuclear estates) developed during PELITA [5-year development plan] III have no farm workers. Of the 110,555 openings for PIR farmers, only 23,247 (21 percent) have been filled. The remaining 79 percent of the estate lands have been planted but are without workers.

According to the Directorate General for Estates, 23,226 houses have been built for the participating farmers, while only 17,462 have been occupied. No reason was given why the remaining 5,764 houses are empty.

Furthermore, the development of land for farms and yards that should have been available to participating PIR farmers is far behind schedule. For PIR special projects alone, only 570 hectares of farmland have been realized of the 4,747 hectares that should have been developed during PELITA III. Only 4,609 hectares of land for yards have been developed of the target area of 8,562 hectares.

The success of PIR projects cannot be measured in terms of estate development alone, but emphasis should be upon success in obtaining the participation of farmers and in improving their welfare. From that aspect, realization is far from the target. Such success is related closely to schedules for placement of farmers and cooperation between agencies. PIR projects must be developed since they are included in regional development.

Do Not Meet Requirements

The selection of PIR participants is actually the responsibility of regional governments, but cooperation is still poor between project directors and regional government officials. People not meeting requirements are often chosen as PIR participants.

Planning for the development of settlements is inadequate. There is lack of synchronization in dealing with water shortages, erection of houses, placement of participants and preparation of public facilities.

Experience with all projects shows that farmland has not been managed well by participating farmers, which is a consequence of their not knowing the technology of cultivating unirrigated land. Their produce has also been hard to sell, owing to the isolated locations of the projects. Furthermore, delay in developing farmland means that farmers have no guaranteed source of income.

Several projects will be productive soon, but differences have occurred in some places between PIR farmers and the estates. Their interests differ, since stable organization has not been established. Matters of disagreement include processing costs, prices, and whether farmers must sell their produce to the estates.

Basic Crops

By the end of PELITA III, 200,154 hectares had been planted in basic crops in PIR projects. This amounted to 64 percent of the target of 314,648 hectares. The developed area consists of 123,997 hectares for rubber (61 percent of target), 50,479 hectares for date palms (64 percent), 13,537 hectares for hybrid coconuts (113 percent), 300 hectares for sugar cane (150 percent), 9,597 hectares for cotton (64 percent), 800 hectares for cashews (31 percent), and 1,444 hectares for tea (62 percent).

The condition of rubber, date palm and hybrid coconut trees is generally satisfactory. Sugar cane is in moderately good condition, but yield is estimated to be low. Cotton at PIR projects may be called the best.

Each project participant is given 1.5 to 3 hectares of land planted in the basic crop. The area is generally 2 hectares. Participants at West Java PIR V and Pleihari Sugar PIR receive 1.5 hectares, while farmers at Danau Salak PIR III, in South Kalimantan, receive 3 hectares. Because cotton participants are rather numerous, they receive an average of .3 hectare each. While plans call for giving 2 hectares to each person at tea PIR's, areas allotted in fact vary from .5 to more than 2 hectares.

The PELITA III target for supplementary PIR projects was 38,800 families, but only 13,463 families (34.6 percent) were realized. The target for PIR Special Projects I was 36,750 families, but only 3,999 families (10.8 percent) were realized, and while the target for PIR Special Projects II was 12,500 families there were no participants at all. Of the local PIR target of 22,456 families, 5,785 families (35.7 percent) were realized.

Overall, there are only 23,247 families (21 percent) for the PIR projects that have been developed for 110,555 families. The remaining openings for 87,308 families have not been filled.

6942

CSO: 4213/115

INDONESIA

GLOOMY FUTURE PREDICTED FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 Dec 84 pp 1, 8

[Excerpts] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Entering 1985, the Indonesian textile industry is approaching a crisis with far-reaching effects on the socioeconomic life of the people. Although the growth of exports is encouraging, with foreign exchange earnings expected to reach \$1 billion by the last year of PELITA [5-year development plan] IV, markets at home are very sluggish now that that public buying power has dried up.

Drs Frans Seda, general chairman of the General Federation of Indonesian Textile Associations [F-API], made this statement at a working meeting with DPR [parliament] Commission VI on Monday [10 December]. The meeting was chaired by the commission chairman, Djoko Sudjatmiko.

Seda said the outlook of the national textile industry is far from bright. Rising exports do not reflect expanding production or recovery of the textile sector from the congestion of 1982. That congestion, which was followed by world recession that also hit Indonesia, bankrupted a number of small and small-to-moderate size factories. Factories of middle size and above were saved because they were able to export. "All of this was the result of an increasingly critical and weak economy," he added.

The national textile industry sells almost all of its products on the home market. The drying up of domestic purchasing power has put the industry in a very alarming situation.

"Per capita income has indeed declined sharply. Per capita income rather than the GDP (gross domestic product) is the indicator of standard of living," he asserted. According to Seda, per capita income last year was only about 391,000 rupiahs, or about \$400.00, based on prices prevailing at that time. "Using World Bank figures of the seventies, the lowest 40 percent of the people receive 11 percent of the national product, 40 percent in the middle get 32 percent, and the elite 20 percent receive 57 percent. That means 80 percent of the Indonesian people get only \$3 to \$10 a month. What will that buy? And they are the consumers of our textiles," he declared.

Height of the Crisis

Seda said that there was in fact some life in the market in 1983 and at the beginning of 1984 but that it was caused by the demand for exports. Nevertheless, the market is being shaken now, not only in downstream industries but in upstream ones as well. At first, downstream inventories piled up. Then, receivables accumulated massively, putting great pressures on liquidity.

"Consequently, not only purchases from upstream sources declined, but workers were threatened with indefinite layoffs," he stated. Businesses able to export were able to breathe a little, but with the imposition of quotas, especially in big markets like the United States, market weakness weighed heavily.

Frans Seda added that the one thing that will save the national textile industry is improvement in public buying power. "In the end, although exports progress, the fate of the textile industry is determined at home. Because of our large human potential and the open market it affords, it cannot be denied that our entire textile industry must be directed domestically," he further declared.

A Billion in Foreign Exchange

According to Seda, who once served as minister of finance, exports have been encouraging since 1983. In that year, exports earned \$277 million in foreign exchange, up 73 percent over the previous year's revenues of \$160 million. As of September of this year, foreign exchange earnings had reached \$313 million. "By the end of the year, I expect them to reach \$350 million. If it were not for the U.S. elections, they could have reached \$400 million," he asserted.

In view of these developments, the government and the API [Indonesian Textile Associations] are establishing a joint program to achieve export earnings of \$1 billion in foreign exchange by the end of PELITA IV, unlike the previous target of only \$500 million. There are at least four steps that must be taken to reach the new target: Diversification of products and prices, diversification of markets, restructuring of the textile industry, and textile diplomacy to deal with the protective measures of the developed countries.

Diversification of products will be performed so that exports will not be merely products affected by quotas. Indonesia is very able to do that. The United States, for example, has 108 categories of textiles, and the EEC has 114 types, but Indonesia is now exporting only about 20 categories. That first step also is related to diversification of prices as part of the effort to assure that the types of textiles exported get the best possible prices.

The second step, market diversification, includes market penetration, and the third step is the restructuring of the domestic textile industry. He said restructuring is only at the study stage now. "We will restructure, not because we made a mistake, but because we need new measures to respond to

challenges arising from developments among the people. Indonesian tastes are not the same as they used to be."

Textile diplomacy involves how the various sectors involved in the textile industry may work hard to combat protective measures taken by developed nations. Behind the MFA [Multinational Fiber Agreement], GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and protection issues there are certain interests, which are not merely the interests of governments but also of the public, as in the United States," he further declared.

6942

CSO: 4213/115

INDONESIA

STATE RUN SUGARCANE PLANTATION LOSSES NOTED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 12 Dec 84 pp 1, 5

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Four state enterprises in the sugar sector lost billions of rupiahs in 1983. PTP [estate company] IX, Medan, lost 10.893 billion rupiahs, PTP XIV at Cirebon 20.121 billion rupiahs, PTP XV-XVI at Solo 6.362 billion rupiahs, and PTP XX at Surabaya 5.886 billion rupiahs.

Engr Hasjrul Harahap, junior minister for estate crops, said in a working meeting with the DPR Budget Commission on Tuesday [11 December] that these losses were a result of very low sugar production.

The junior minister also told the meeting, which was chaired by Budget Commission Deputy Chairman Parulian Silalahi, of the difference between the sugar situation before World War II and now. Sugar cane was formerly planted in rice fields, which were fertile and irrigated, but now some is planted in dry fields. In spite of everything, the yield of cane planted in dry fields is low, Hasjrul asserted.

Furthermore, plants and technology used now do not match those employed before the war, with the result that sugar quality and production fall short. Overhead costs in the companies have also risen.

To reduce PTP losses, the junior minister is proposing that credit interest for government estate enterprises be reduced from 18 to 12 percent annually. The TRI [smallholder sugar cane intensification] program actually does not differ from the PIR [smallholder nuclear estates] program: Smallholder sugar cane is the "plasma," and the PTP is the nucleus. Interest for both should therefore be 12 percent.

Decline

Soedjai Kartasasmita, secretary of the DGI (Indonesian Sugar Council), who also attended the meeting, added that sugar production before World War II was tremendous. In the 1920's, production once reached 3 million tons per year. During the "malaise" period, production declined steadily to 1.5 million tons.

Productivity was good in those days because sugar mills chose the best irrigated land in Java. Furthermore, the "reynoso" system used then was the

most suitable for this region. Norms were also followed carefully because of strong pressures from the mills.

After the war, sugar production declined, then rose again to the current 1.7 to 1.8 million tons per year. Productivity is still low, however, since the land planted in cane is not as fertile as land used in the past, and cultivation technology and work methods are still far from satisfactory.

As another example, he said that before the war a sugar mill handled only 1,500 hectares of cane, but now one mill must control an area of 4,000 hectares. Having to transport the cane so far clearly affects its quality.

Fields Leased

Soedjai reiterated that sugar mills should direct work in the field, which is in agreement with the government's policy. Mill administrators then will be responsible for giving the best possible guidance to farmers for improvement of productivity.

The issue of sugar cane farmers is indeed very complex, encompassing ownership of small parcels of land, crop rotation, plants, combatting pests and disease, fertilizer, credit, etc. Furthermore, TRI fields are not controlled by the workers themselves but by people with money.

For example, in the area of PTP XIV, Cirebon, 65 percent of the smallholder sugar cane land is on long-term lease to others. In fact, information obtained by KOMPAS indicates that only seven percent of cane farmers are working their own fields. The rest of the work is handed over to group leaders, or the fields are leased to other people.

Nevertheless, Soedjai said, the sugar yield from cane is quite good this year. Yield has reached 8.57 percent, with a production of 64.5 quintals of sugar crystals per hectare.

6942

CSO: 4213/115

INDONESIA

ONE-STOP SERVICE PLANNED FOR REGIONAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 13 Dec 84 pp 1, 13

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Approvals previously issued by regional governments in connection with BKPM (Regional Capital Investment Coordination Board) permission for investment will soon be issued directly by the BKPM. What will initially be a system of service under one roof will ultimately be one-stop service.

This was revealed by Engr Suhartoyo, chairman of the BKPM (Capital Investment Coordination Board), and Drs Atar Sibero, director general for regional development of the Department of Home Affairs, in response to KOMPAS questions in Jakarta on Wednesday [12 December] following the opening of the 3-day Regional Investment Profile Seminar.

Suhartoyo said that in order to further encourage capital investment in Indonesia BKPM approval procedures will be improved when upgrading of BKPM investment procedures is completed. The work is being done jointly by the minister of home affairs and the MENPAN [minister for administrative reform]. "We are merely helping," he said.

The focus of the improvements will be BKPM capability to issue regional approvals, such as for location, building and environmental impact, through authority delegated by regional governments. "Therefore, work before done by regional governments, whether level I or II, or location approvals handled through Agraria offices, will now be done directly by the BKPM. One-stop service will be even more tremendous," he declared. "Procedures at BKPM headquarters have been like that for some time."

Afford Certainty

Atar Sibero said these measures have been taken to give assurance to investors. "The purpose is to afford to investors some certainty of the time required for processing of approvals. They will no longer have to go to a regency to get a building permit or to an Agraria office for land use approval. This will save money as well as time," he stated.

Ultimately, there will be one-stop service as well as service under one roof. Sibero said in reply to a question that he did know for sure when the new

rules will go into effect but hoped that it would be soon, possibly before the end of 1984. They will be in the form of a letter of decision from the minister of home affairs. "Discussion on the new rules between the MENPAN and the BKPM have reached the final stage," he said. Dr Saleh Afiff, MENPAN/deputy chairman of BAPPENAS [National Development Planning Board], also touched on this matter some time ago in a working meeting of BAPPENAS and the DPR [parliament] budget commission. He said that BKPM procedures would be improved soon and that rules for simplified handling of BKPM approvals would be issued. The BKPM is responsible for approving PMDN (domestic capital investment) up to 150 million rupiahs.

Not BKPM Responsibility

In reply to a question on the much-discussed issue of monopolies in the national industrial sector, Suhartoyo said the matter was not the responsibility of the BKPM. He said that in granting investment approval the BKPM uses the priority list [DSP] proposed by technical departments. If an investor asks for permission to make an investment consistent with the DSP, the BKPM will give approval without considering whether it will be a monopoly or not.

"The BKPM works on the basis of a DSP compiled by technical departments. Which is permissible or not? Which may have only one? Which may have many or few? Those are up to the departments. We don't delete or add," he declared.

He did say, however, that he agrees with Minister of Industry Engr Hartoyo, who said that monopoly cannot be avoided during certain periods of industrial development, especially in upstream industries. The important thing is to seek a level of efficiency in industry.

Methods of achieving efficiency in consumer goods industries with large volumes of business differ from those used in industries which produce capital goods and raw materials and which have low business volumes. In the first case, efficiency is achieved through competition and expansion of markets, but producers of capital goods cannot be expected to be more competitive.

It is possible, of course, that a consumer goods industry will fail to be competitive with similar industries. "But the consequences will not be too serious, since investments were small. But there will be trouble if an industry producing capital goods and raw materials is not efficient, because investments were great," he declared.

6942

CSO: 4213/115

INDONESIA

PROFITS OF PT NURTANIO, PT PAL REPORTED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 14 Dec 84 p 1

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Before-tax profits of PT [limited company] Nurtanio in 1983 were 10.761 billion rupiahs. If audits confirm this figure, gross cumulative profits from 1976 to 1983 will be 23.17 billion rupiahs.

Cumulative profits after taxes will be 13.078 billion rupiahs. The profits of PT PAL for fiscal 1983, its first profitable year, were estimated at 4.644 billion rupiahs. Audit is now underway by the Directorate General for Oversight of State Finances (DJPN) and the Board for Oversight of Finance and Development (BPKP).

MENRISTEK [minister of state for research and technology] Dr B. J. Habibie revealed this on Thursday [13 December] at a working meeting with DPR [parliament] Commission X at the DPR/MPR [People's Consultative Congress] building.

PT Nurtanio and PT PAL are among the eight strategic industries under the oversight of the Strategic Industry Council, chaired by the MENRISTEK. The other strategic industries are PT PINDAD, PT INKA, PT LEN, PT Dahana, PT INTI and PT Krakatau Steel. The MENRISTEK is also the principal director of PT NURTANIO, PT PAL AND PT PINDAD.

At the end of PELITA [5-year development plan] III, government investment in PT Nurtanio was 421.11 billion rupiahs, PT PAL 187.458 billion rupiahs, and PT PINDAD 15.244 billion rupiahs. These industries are controlled completely by the government, and no foreign investment is permitted.

The MENRISTEK was unable to offer profit and loss figures for PT PINDAD, established in May 1983, because agreement has not yet been reached with DJPN and BPKP on basic costs of products. PT Nurtanio's first profits came in fiscal 1978, when it earned 1.4 billion rupiahs after taxes. It lost .544 billion rupiahs in 1976, its first year of operation, and lost .209 billion rupiahs in 1977. PT PAL lost 1.407 billion rupiahs in its first year of operation, 3.12 billion rupiahs in 1981, and 3.912 billion rupiahs in 1982.

He said he had no authority to release data on the other strategic industries.

6942

CSO: 4213/115

LAOS

'LETTERS' COLUMN FOCUSES ON BORDER DISPUTE

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Dec 84 p 3

["Letters" Column: "How Do Chinese Expansionism and Hegemonism and Pan-Thaism Work Together?"]

[Text] Not long after the announcement of the 'Letters' column our editorial staff received letters and phone calls asking about many things. But the issue most people were interested in was the collusion between the Chinese reactionaries and the ultrarightist reactionaries of the Thai ruling clique against the Lao people and the three nations in Indochina. They asked whether and how Chinese expansionism and hegemonism is in collusion with pan-Thaism, and how they work against our country.

It is not easy to provide a clear answer to these questions by briefly writing because they involve the changing history and political policies of the Chinese and Thai leaders over a period of time. However, we would like to give our views as follows. First of all, we must clearly understand that Chinese expansionism and hegemonism and pan-Thaism have the same goal which is to invade, encroach upon, and swallow other nations. In applying this system they have been using all types of techniques and schemes by both nonmilitary means such as bribes and inciting against internal and international division, and also by threatening by force.

The Beijing ruling power clique has put its utmost energy into carrying out expansionism and hegemonism toward the three nations in Indochina. For example, after the three Indochinese nations emerged victorious from the war of aggression waged against them, the American imperialists and the Chinese reactionary henchmen intended to block off Indochina. They wanted to create trouble for Indochina to force it to surrender. They began with having the obedient Pol Pot henchmen commit genocide against the Cambodian people, creating a war of aggression along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, and using 600,000 soldiers to attack North Vietnam. After their schemes were defeated they colluded with the ultrarightist reactionaries of the Thai ruling clique to support Pol Pot's men and to provoke a war of aggression along the Thai-Cambodian and Chinese-Vietnamese borders. Particularly, in Laos, first the Chinese reactionaries sent many battalions to the border to make threats and provocations in many ways. However, because of the correct and just policy

of our party and the support of the peace-loving peoples throughout the world, the Chinese reactionaries have not yet dared to provoke a war of aggression at the Chinese-Lao border. The reason is that they do not want to be humiliated. Their country is large with millions of people, and if they were to accuse Laos, a country with only over 3 million people, of invading them as they accused Vietnam of invading China, no one would believe them. Much worse is that the peoples of the world would just laugh at them. Thus, China has been pushing Thailand, especially the ultrarightist reactionaries of the Thai ruling clique that already cherish the policy of pan-Thaism, to be the ones who carry things out whenever it is a good time to do so. They also received rewards from China in terms of money, weapons, and advisors. Therefore, the ultrarightist reactionaries of the Thai ruling clique considered themselves lucky and are ready to do everything that Beijing commands, hoping to get something in return as in the past. When they served the Japanese and British fascists they received part of Malaysia, Burma and some provinces in Cambodia and Laos. For these reasons we can say that Chinese expansionism and pan-Thaism get along very well because of their similar goals which are to invade, encroach upon and swallow up other countries.

The techniques that are used to work against our country were demonstrated as follows. On 15 May 1984 Athit Kamlang-ek the leader of the Thai ultrarightist reactionaries visited Beijing and returned to Bangkok on 24 May 1984. He ordered the Thahan Phran Irregulars (regional forces) to go to the three villages of Ban Mai, Ban Kang and Ban Savang in Sayaboury Province, but they were forced to retreat by our guerrilla militia who exercised their mastery of self-defense. On 26 May 1984 Athit again ordered the Thahan Phran Irregulars into the three Lao villages, but this time they were defeated by our guerrilla militia twice. This was a real defeat, and the Thahan Phran Irregulars could not enter the three villages. Thus, on 1 June 1984 Athit came to (Bo Beui) (a Thai village adjoining the border near the three Lao villages) in order to adopt a plan by which over 2,000 [soldiers] of the first cavalry division with the support of artillery, tanks and warplanes would attack and encroach upon the three villages on 6 June 1984. This was definitely a prepared plan and was not an accident. It was different from past Lao-Thai border clashes, e.g., in Don Sangkhi, Don Singsou, Pha Mon and Oudomsai, or the border clashes between Thailand and Malaysia and Burma because they got lost in the territory and after a couple of days they could solve the conflict because both sides withdrew.

However, the case of the three villages is different. It is a matter of resistance and intention to invade, the use of a mobile army and regular forces with tanks and airplanes to carry out an attack under the direct command of the RTA Supreme Commander. Thus, it is deceitful on the part of Thailand to say that this is a minor common problem as were the Thai-Malaysian and Thai-Burmese problems. The case of the three villages is different from the former border clashes because

of the use of over 2,000 regular troops in occupying the three villages. Later, they forced the people to change their family records and to change administrative committees or get new village heads. The Lao people had to speak the Thai language and learn from Thai books, etc.

Their acts demonstrated serious aggression. The Thai wanted to revive and exercise pan-Thaism with regard to Laos as they had done to Laos for over 200 years. Now they wanted to bring it back again. Secondly, the collusion between the Chinese power-holding clique and the Thai ultrarightist reactionaries hopes to oppress Laos and to resist the LPDR, and to have Laos surrender to them. Thirdly, the war of aggression of one nation towards another, both of whom are members of the United Nations, violates the U.N. charter, Article 51, which says that "When a member country of the United Nations is invaded by force that nation has the right to defend itself in a timely manner, and if necessary force must be used."

Thus, the incident of the three Lao villages is not a trivial matter. When the Thai said that it was a minor fraternal problem and that only a few talks would solve it, this was all to deceive world opinion so that they would not pay attention to it. This is because they fear that they will be humiliated, and that their hidden intention in colluding and carrying out Chinese expansionism and pan-Thaism against the LPDR will be exposed.

This is all we will discuss this week. If there is any matter that is still unclear please write or call us again. We will try to answer your concerns as much as we can.

9884

CSO: 4206/76

LAOS

COLUMN SEES NEED FOR PUBLIC SECURITY, MILITARY MOBILIZATION

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Dec 84 p 3

[The 30th Anniversary of the LPRP Which Organized and Led All Victories of the Lao Revolution Column: "To Guarantee National Defense and Security at the Grassroots"]

[Text] The theme for the training of party cadres and members is to raise patriotism and love for socialism, [to give a] clear understanding of the enemies' schemes and the ability to differentiate friend from foe, [to infuse a] high revolutionary consciousness and a determination to fight psychological warfare, espionage and all the enemies' movements, to determinedly participate in constructing national defense and security, and to get ready to make sacrifices for firmly defending the nation and the new socialism.

To effectively achieve these duties the party committees and the grassroots party chapters must have a plan to find the enemies' destructive schemes. Thus, it is necessary to suppress and arrest those who spread distorted policies, spies, and those who incite unrest and destroy order.

There must be immediate training and transformation at the grassroots to mobilize the expected number of young people to voluntarily become soldiers, to make them feel proud and happy and aware of their honor and responsibility in the ranks of the army in order to defend their beloved land, to determinedly implement the policy for the rear army, and to attentively take good care of the families of those who made their sacrifice for the nation and disabled people and soldiers. We must organize and strengthen guerrilla militia forces. In particular, we must focus on selecting those who have good political traits and training along with raising their standard of living so they will become enthusiastic, highly responsible and able to prepare to counter all the enemies' destruction at the grassroots.

9884
CSO: 4206/76

PHILIPPINES

RAMOS INITIATES 4 JANUARY 85 PC-INP REASSIGNMENTS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 5 Jan 85 pp 1, 3

[Text] Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, acting Armed Forces chief of staff of the Constabulary and Integrated National Police (INP), effected reassignments in the PC-INP yesterday, with the approval of President Marcos.

General Ramos designated Brig. Gen. Alfredo S. Lim, superintendent of the Philippine National Police Academy in Canlubang, Laguna, as superintendent of the Northern Police District (NPD) based in Camp Karingal, Quezon City.

Lim takes over the NPD post today from Brig. Gen. Celestino Rosca who retired.

Named successor of Lim at the PNPA was his deputy, Col. Carlos C. Javier.

Ramos relieved Col. Maximo Mejia as provincial commander of Bulacan. Mejia, who was reassigned to the AFP headquarters, was replaced by Lt. Col Cesar Alvarez, provincial commander of Bataan.

Lt. Col. Romeo Andaya of the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG) was designated Bataan PC-INP commander.

[Section by J. Larrosa]

[Text] When Brig. Gen. Alfredo S. Lim assumes command of the Northern Police District (NPD), the entire four districts of the Metropolitan Police Force (MPF) will be under superintendents coming from the Manila's Finest (now Western Police District) for the first time in postwar years.

The three others are Brig. Gen. Narciso Cabrera, WPD superintendent, Brig. Gen. Ruben Escarcha, Southern Police District (SPD) superintendent, and Brig. Gen. Alfredo H. Yson, Eastern Police District (EPD) superintendent.

Lim, 55, becomes the youngest chief of a MPF district, two days younger than Escarcha.

Lim, who was head of the Philippine National Police Academy, was replaced by Col. Carlos Javier, EPD deputy superintendent. Javier in turn was replaced by Col. Manuel Roxas, chief of the Pasig police station, in a concurrent capacity.

Lim takes over from Brig. Gen. Celestino C. Rosca who is retiring after a colorful career at turnover ceremonies to be held at Camp Gen. Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City.

The only other time in history that all of Manila and suburbs were placed under the command of the Manila police chief was during the Japanese Occupation when the force was headed by Col. Antonio Torres.

At the turn of the century on Jan. 9, 1901, the first chief of the Manila police, the late Gen. Arthur McArthur, father of the legendary Gen. Douglas McArthur, assumed jurisdiction not only of Manila but the entire Philippine Islands.

A benedalled police officer, Lim is a lawyer and a certified public accountant (CPA). He joined the Manila police force in 1951 as a ptrolman together with Escarcha, now Ambassador to Soviet Union Romeo Fernandez, Antonio Perry, now vice president of the Republic Bank, and Feliciano Barlis, now general manager and personnel manager of BF Goodrich.

CSO: 4200/ 466

PHILIPPINES

WITNESSES DISAPPEAR IN SAMAR CASE AGAINST CLERICS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 5 Jan 85 p 6

[Text] Two witnesses against five priests and 12 other religious personalities charged with subversion in a court in Catbalogan, Eastern Samar, mysteriously disappeared months ago without any trace.

Brig. Gen. Salvador Mison, commander of Regional Unified Command (RUC)-VIII, reported yesterday the witnesses' disappearance to Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, acting chief of staff of the Armed Forces.

Mison said that intelligence operatives of his command have launched a hunt for the two--Juanito Delamida, 22, and Renato Lucero, both of Samar.

Delamida was chief of the production division of the Pope Pius VI Action Center in Catbalogan which was raided by the military in 1982.

The raid resulted in the arrest of the late Fr. Edgardo Kangleon, Delamida and Antonio Asistio, a former student of the University of the Philippines who was chief researcher of the SAC which the military said was the center of subversive activities and anti-government propaganda in Eastern Visayas.

Mison said that President Marcos granted Kangleon, Delamida and Asistio amnesty on Oct. 7, 1983 "for their willingness to return to the fold of society and help the government."

Kangleon died in a car accident on Jan. 4, 1984 in Greenhills, San Juan Metro Manila.

Asistio elected to be under the protective custody of the military and resumed his studies in UP as a scholar of the defense ministry.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

NEW NDF 12-POINT PROGRAM REPORTED

Cebu City VISAYAN HERALD in English 5 Jan 85 p 2

[Text] Manila (PNF)--The National Democratic Front (NDF), the nationwide united front organization led by the Philippine Left, reiterated recently its call on Filipinos to "unite to overthrow the United States-backed Marcos government" through a "people's war" and to establish a "democratic coalition government."

PNF received through the mails over the weekend a draft copy of the newest version of the NDF's general program, with a brief note explaining the document's salient features. The final text of the program, the note said, will be published on January 1, 1985.

The previous 10-point program of the NDF has apparently been updated to reflect new political and economic developments since the Aquino assassination and has been expanded to 12 points.

The NDF's 12-Point Program, according to it "remains valid and binding for the entire course of the struggle for national liberation and democracy and provides the strategic direction for the implementation of its immediate tasks," as follows:

- "1. Unite the Filipino to overthrow the tyrannical rule of U.S. imperialism and the local reactionaries.
- "2. Wage a people's war to win national victory.
- "3. Establish a democratic coalition government and a people's democratic republic.
- "4. Integrate the revolutionary armed forces into a single national revolutionary army.
- "5. Uphold and promote the free exercise of the people's basic democratic rights.
- "6. Terminate all unequal relations with the United States and other foreign entities.

"7. Complete the process of genuine land reform, raise rural production through cooperation, and modernize agriculture.

"8. Carry out national industrialization as the leading factor in economic development.

"9. Effect full employment, raise the people's living standards, and expand social services the soonest after establishing democratic state power.

"10. Promote a patriotic, scientific and popular culture and ensure free public education.

"11. Respect and foster the self-determination of the Moro people and all ethnic minorities.

"12. Adopt and practice a revolutionary, independent and peace-loving foreign policy."

The NDF came into being in April 1973, half a year after the imposition of martial law in 1972, when its Preparatory Commission, composed of communists and other patriots, nationalists and democrats, was organized. Besides the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed force, the New People's Army, other clandestine organizations initially affiliated with the NDF are the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) and the Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth). Underground progressive organizations of various sectors in Philippine society have also since joined the united front organization.

Although not formally members of the NDF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), are known to maintain close relations with the former.

The NDF and the MNLF have cooperated in joint political and military actions, notably in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, and also in diplomatic initiatives abroad. The NDF and MNLF represented the Filipino and Moro peoples, respectively, in anti-imperialist world people's congress in Algeria, and in the International People's Tribunal in Europe, early in the decade.

The NDF has emerged as "the broadest, strongest and most consolidated nationwide organization" in the underground opposing the Marcos government and aiming to fundamentally reshape the Philippines into what it calls a "national democratic society."

Its official publication locally is Liberation. It also publishes the Philippine NDF Update in several countries abroad, and maintains official missions in a number of countries. A score of governments, national liberation movements and socialist organizations abroad have to date extended official recognition to the NDF.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

TEXT OF CONVENOR GROUP 'DECLARATION OF UNITY'

Quezon City VERITAS in English 6 Jan 85 p 12

[Text of the Declaration of Unity forced by the Convenor Group. VERITAS "is printing the declaration in toto to clarify the issues regarding the 'fast track' formula and the aims and objectives of the Convenor Group."]

[Text] Whereas, it has become an imperative duty for all who oppose the Marcos regime to join forces to restore the freedom and sovereignty of the Filipino people and thereafter reconstruct the national economy and improve the quality of life of all Filipinos, starting with the poor, the voiceless and the oppressed; and

Whereas, we believe that the foregoing objectives can best be attained by implementing the following values, principles, and convictions which we all share:

1. Respect for Freedom of Conscience and Religion

Freedom of conscience and religion will be protected and no one will be excluded from active participation in the life of the nation because of his beliefs.

2. Belief in the Inalienable Dignity of the Human Person

Every human being has certain inalienable rights which he cannot be deprived of by the state or by anyone else. He is the subject, not the object, of development, and every socio-economic program, to be authentic, must seek human and not merely economic development. The state exists for the people, not the people for the state.

Thus, as a minimum,

2.1 Basic constitutional rights such as, among others, due process, free speech, free press, the right of information, freedom of assembly, freedom from torture and from unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of movement, and to decide one's domicile, must obtain not merely in our statute books and jurisprudence but also in the very conduct of government and its officials and the latter's interaction with the citizenry.

2.2 Violations of human rights, past or future, will be subject to immediate prosecution; and

2.3 General and unconditional amnesty will be granted to all political detainees and all political offenders.

3. Belief in Developing the Fullness of Our Nationhood and in the Supremacy of the National Interest.

The Filipino people must be the sole determinants of the nation's political, economic and cultural life, and the principal beneficiaries of the national patrimony. Patriotism and nationalism should be fostered, and in no case may the national interest be sacrificed to foreign or personal interests.

Thus, as a minimum,

3.1 The freedom of the nation from any form of economic, cultural, and political domination or interference by the government of any foreign power or by any international institution or group will be safeguarded.

3.2 A self-determined and autonomous course of economic, social and political development will be pursued to provide a higher income for all, expand the domestic market, foster profitable foreign trade, establish appropriate basic industries, develop effective technology, encourage the use of Filipino creativity and resourcefulness, and promote equity in the use of resources and in the distribution of the fruits of development.

3.3 All economic and financial agreements, entered into, assumed or guaranteed by the Marcos regime, will be subjected to public review to ensure that the welfare of our people has not been sacrificed to foreign or private domestic economic or financial interests.

3.4 An educational system will be established which shall provide opportunity of education for all and stress our national identity, foster desirable Filipino moral values and principles, promote critical thinking, creativity, and scientific research, uphold civilian supremacy over the military and prevent militarization, encourage the development of technology and inculcate responsible citizenship.

3.5 The Philippines will seek to actively cooperate with its neighbors to make ASEAN, in particular, and Southeast Asia, in general, a zone of neutrality, freedom and peace, free of all nuclear weapons and free from the domination of all foreign powers.

3.6 Foreign military bases on Philippine territory must be removed and no foreign military bases shall hereafter be allowed.

3.7 The government shall recognize that members of national minorities have the same rights as other citizens, including the right to participate on an equal basis in public life, and shall take affirmative action to ensure equality. The government shall enforce respect for the right of such peoples

to preserve their identity, traditions, language, cultural heritage, customary laws, and their ancestral domains, bearing in mind the changes that have taken or are taking place in those communities.

4. Belief that Ownership of the Principal Means of Production must be Diffused and Income Equitably Distributed to Promote Development, Combat Poverty and Ensure the Rational Utilization of Resources.

Since material wealth is not just for the welfare of its owner but also for the welfare of all, the ostentatious display of wealth is to be deplored the accumulation of profit must be subordinated to the demands of social justice, and the use of resources must be for the benefit of all, especially the underprivileged.

Thus, as a minimum,

4.1 Social structures that perpetuate inequality and the oppression of the poor and the dispossessed will be eliminated.

4.2 Effective cooperatives will be promoted;

4.3 Free trade unionism will be encouraged and the right to organize, to picket, and to strike will be fully and vigorously protected,

4.4 An effective land reform program truly beneficial to the underprivileged will be vigorously and honestly pursued, and

4.5 Industrial and agricultural monopolies prejudicial to the national interest will be abolished.

5. Belief in Free, Orderly and Honest Elections

Since elections are the principal means through which the people exercise their sovereignty and express their will, the subversion of the electoral process by authoritarianism or by fraud or terrorism is high treason. All forms of authoritarianism shall be firmly and vigorously resisted, and the present electoral system and institutions will be thoroughly overhauled to ensure free, orderly and honest elections.

Thus, as a minimum,

5.1 Every effort will be exerted toward the formulation and popular ratification of a new Constitution within eighteen months after the new leadership shall have assumed office.

5.2 The new Constitution shall provide for:

5.2.1 Effective local political units and institutions that will lodge the power to make political and economic decisions as close to the people as possible.

5.2.2 Representation in the legislative body, by direct vote by the people, for all sectors and classes of society.

5.2.3 A President and in a Vice-President elected for a definite, limited term by direct vote of the people.

5.2.4 An independent, capable and honest judiciary.

5.2.5 An adequate system of checks and balances and of public accountability

5.2.6 The supremacy of civilian over military authority.

5.2.7 An effective system of recall of any elective/appointive public official, paving the way for an earlier replacement or a reaffirmation of the people's confidence in the said public official.

5.2.8 The repeal of Amendment 6 and of the immunity provided for in Article VII, Section 15 of Marcos constitution.

5.3 The new leadership, in accordance with the principle of firm resistance to all forms of authoritarianism, will not resort to Amendment 6 of the Marcos constitution.

5.4 Martial Law shall not be declared and the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended without the prior concurrence of the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the legislature and only for a limited period.

5.5 All oppressive and arbitrary presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders and proclamations shall be repealed.

6. Belief in a Pluralistic Society

The new leadership will respect and protect freedom of expression and the right to disseminate all philosophies and non-violent programs. It trusts the capacity of the people to choose freely what is best for the nation, and will honor the choice of the people even if it differs from theirs.

The Communist Party of the Philippines will be legalized.

In order to remove obstacles to national unity, the new leadership will take steps, immediately upon assumption of office, to redress all legitimate grievances of all who have resorted to armed struggle.

7. Belief that Leadership Means Service to the People

The new leadership commits itself not only to working for the people, but also to working with the people, particularly the poor and the oppressed.

3. Belief in Accountability to the People.

Public office is not a property owned by an individual or a family, but a privilege granted by, and exercised for the benefit of, the people. The people have the right to know how every public official exercises the powers of his office and to hold him responsible for not using those powers and for misusing or abusing them.

Thus, as a minimum,

8.1 The new leadership commits itself to eliminate the social cancer of graft and corruption, public and private, and to establish an honest, efficient and just system of public service.

8.2 Victims of the Marcos regime shall be entitled to restitution or compensation in damages to the fullest extent possible.

8.3 Ill-gotten wealth, property and assets shall be confiscated or sequestered for the direct benefit of the entire body politic and all special privileges given individuals close to the Marcos regime shall be immediately terminated. Properties illegally taken by the Marcos regime from private individuals shall be returned to their owners.

Therefore, we sign these presents to solemnly reaffirm our commitment to the foregoing values, principles and convictions and to signify our resolve to exhaust all means to unify all parties, organizations and forces in opposition to the Marcos regime.

Signed in Quezon City this 26th day of December, 1984.

By:

1. Agapito "Butz" Aquino
By Ernesto Lichauco
2. Jose W. Diokno
3. Teofisto Guingona
6. Raul S. Manglapus
By Ramon Tagle, Jr.
7. Ramon Mitra, Jr.
8. Ambrosio Padilla
9. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.
10. Rafael Salas
By Ben Hur Balboa
11. Jovito Salonga
By Steve Salonga

By the Convenor Group:

1. Corazon C. Aquino
2. Jaime V. Ongpin
3. Lorenzo M. Tanada

Note: Eva Estrad Kalaw, No. 4, and Salvador Laurel, No. 5 did not sign the declaration.

PHILIPPINES

VERITAS PROFILES GROWING ROLE OF LEFTIST YOUTH MOVEMENT

'Martial Law Babies' Lead Confrontations

Quezon City VERITAS in English 6 Jan 85 pp 8-10

[Article by Ma. Theresa R. Martelino: "More Alive in '85"]

[Text] Angry and unsmiling, arms raised in defiance, they are the forefront of every rally. They are the first to get teargassed, first to get truncheoned, first to get shot at, but always the first to come back for another round of battle with anti-riot police. They have a representative who stands uncompromising in his demands in every negotiating panel.

Martial law babies, they are called. Barely in their teens in 1972 when, on the brink of revolution, the country lay battered by violent demonstrations, they did not understand the ideals student activists were then willing to give up their lives for. They hardly understood that a new era in the Philippine history was unfolding before their very eyes, and they could not have perceived the tremendous effects Presidential Decree 1081 would have on the country, the Filipino psyche, and their very own lives. Most definitely, they had not foreseen the role they would eventually play as agents of change in Philippine society more than a decade later.

Reared on the principles of the New Society and its mottoes of "Para sa Kaunlaran, Disiplina and Kailangan," and "Isang Bansa, Isang Diwa," these martial law babies were at best apolitical when they entered the university. As student leaders today, they have joined the mass movement out to topple the Marcos government and its ally, the United States. They seek a new order that gives no room for one-man rule and foreign domination, and offers equal opportunities for every member of society. They are martial law babies no more.

When President Marcos declared martial law in September, 1972, perhaps the hardest hit sector was the studentry which suffered an organizational setback. If they were not arrested or killed, they either went to the hills to take up arms, went underground, or simply gave up the struggle altogether. A definite number, however, remained in the universities to once again begin the educational and organizational campaign.

Progressing slowly at first, they began with small rallies which focused largely on campus-based issues such as the restoration of student councils, school papers, academic freedom and the legalization of student organizations. By 1977, the student movement had gained enough strength to be able to launch the first coordinated sectoral actions participated in by 120,000 students in some 24 schools in Metro Manila. That was the first wave.

The second wave came in 1980 when around 240,000 of the 400,000 total student population in the tertiary level in Metro Manila participated in protests highlighting campus as well as national issues such as rising oil prices and wage increases. Coming from 36 schools, these student-demonstrators carried a campaign for a democratic reforms movement as articulated by the League of Filipino Students (LFS).

By 1981, the movement became national in scope carrying issues from a national perspective when students in Davao, Cebu, Cagayan, Bacolod, Central Luzon, Bulacan, Pampanga, Baguio and other secondary urban centers took part in mass actions. At this point, the student movement took an outright political color demanding basic changes in both the educational system as well as society in general. They demanded the dismantling of the so-called "US-Marcos dictatorship."

With the march to Malacanang on May 11, 1983--the first since 1972--the student movement ceased being a propaganda movement and was transformed instead into a political force. Student leaders like to describe it as a movement "with a political line consistent with that of the mass movement, with an articulated program, a national organization, and which believes in militant forms of struggle." It has grown into such a strong force that its leaders believe it can now confront the "dictatorship directly."

The movement, which considers itself progressive essentially because it has a "nationalist and democratic perspective," claims to be the only real movement among the studentry today "in the practical and theoretical sense" i.e., numbers, political dynamics, perspective, history. As a student movement, it stands for such students' rights and welfare as 1. academic freedom, 2. students' right to free and quality education, 3. students' right to peacefully assemble and assert their rights, and 4. students' right to defend themselves if they are attacked while asserting their rights.

As a sector of society, the students consider themselves to be part and parcel of the mass movement which believes Philippine society is undemocratic and that the country is being run by the United States for its own selfish interests. "We believe in a comprehensively anti-dictatorship program and we see the problems of society both in the economic and political levels as being rooted in the US domination of our country. We believe in the militant mass struggles of our people," explained Lean Alejandro, deputy secretary general of the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD) and former chairman of the University of the Philippines student council.

Its analysis of Philippine conditions stems from the observation that the "Marcos clique" (President Marcos and his political and business cronies)

has denied the Filipino people, especially the lower classes (peasants, farmers, and workers), their democratic and human rights either through deception or outright physical violence. It perceives the presence of foreign interests in the country as the root of the problem.

Firstly, there is the economic dominance of foreigners (60-70 percent of strategic capital in manufacturing, shipping, financing, mining are controlled by foreign capital). Secondly, the movement believes that the United States supports the "dictatorship in spite of its very inhuman record." Thirdly, it believes that the presence of the American bases in the country "is a slap to our national patrimony and which is a threat to the survival of every Filipino, including Marcos, in the event of a nuclear war."

Espousing a program for nationalism, democracy, social justice, and progress, the studentry has been organized into four sectors: College Editors Guild of the Philippines (for student journalists), Student Christian Movement (for the Christian youth), the National Union of Students in the Philippines (for officers of student councils) and the League of Filipino Students (all students in general). All four organizations fall under an umbrella called Makabayan headed by UP's Loudette Almazan.

Makabayan has a nationwide network that works hand in hand with other sectors. In its commitment to a militant mass struggle, it endorses the most effective militant weapon of every sector (workers--the strike; students--boycott and barricades, and peasants--arms) and to use that weapon to attain its objectives. It believes that if all peaceful means have been exhausted, the people have the right to take up arms.

The student movement of today finds itself in the peaceful, legal, open urban mass movement and not in the armed struggle or the anti-dictatorship but pro-American opposition for several reasons, according to Alejandro. Firstly, the urban mass movement can politicize the greatest number of people in the shortest possible time. "If we are an underground group, we cannot call for a rally of 40,000 in Liwasang Bonifacio to tell them, ganito ang analysis namin sa Agrava report," he said.

Secondly, Alejandro went on, "You cannot dismantle (the) Marcos (regime) solely through arms. There is no military solution to Marcos, we need a political solution." This is why a strong urban movement is important. "It has put Marcos on the defensive even tactically. For example, last September 21, if he let us stay (on Mendiola), panalo kami. Kung ginulpi niya kami, panalo pa rin kami. We can size the initiative to such an extent that we can even define his options and put him on the defensive, talo siya either way," the student leader explained.

Thirdly, the leadership in the movement believes that the urban mass movement can paralyze the economy and bureaucracy in a general strike. They are right now preparing for such a strike that will paralyze the country and which will hopefully, play a vital role in the "dismantling of the regime."

According to Elmer Mercado, chairman of LFS, the movement is now at a state preparatory to an offensive position. The students are now in the process of consolidating their ranks even as they continue to organize and educate the other students who are as of yet, unorganized.

Although the leaders of Makabayan, one of the more militant student organizations, believe they speak for the majority of the Filipino studentry, there are other groups that seek basic changes in society but do not belong to the same political persuasion. The Ateneo Student council, for example, looks forward to a socialist system once the Marcos government has been ousted. Relatively new in its political direction, it espouses a peaceful but radical means of toppling the "dictatorship." In their analysis of Philippine society, according to Joly Macuja, external vice president of the Ateneo student council, the one overriding problem is the basic inequity of the distribution of the country's resources. The culprit, he says, is domestic capitalism.

According to Macuja and Vicente Pacheco, an officer of the Youth for the Advancement of Faith and Justice from the University of Sto. Tomas, a Christian response must be found to the country's problems and violence will not help any.

De la Salle's Albert Villadolid, on the other hand, proposes a "free-wheeling interplay of ideologies" to solve the country's "structural and personal problems." The country's structures, according to him, are such that they allow injustice and oppression to occur in society. He also believes that there are people in Philippine society today who desire to perpetuate themselves in power.

Whatever their beliefs, these student leaders are convinced that basic changes are necessary for the survival of their country. They perceive the need for them to take a stand and take an active part in shaping the future. If for only that, they should be given credit. And if they succeed in changing the society they are so displeased with, if they succeed in creating a political, economic, social order that respects their ideals, then these young men and women would be an asset to the Filipino race.

Three Leaders Profiled

Quezon City VERITAS in English 6 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Gigi S. Oyog]

[Text] If events had been different, Leandro Alejandro, Elmer Mercado, and Alexander Padilla would probably have been anywhere else but the protest movement.

Lean, straight out of the then still American-run St. James school in Navotas, was not only "generally apathetic" as he entered the University of the Philippines in 1973, he was in fact "pro-Marcos."

When Elmer was still a UP freshman in 1977, he was concerned more with 'sticking with his barkada,' passing his subjects, and avoiding "terror teachers. He did join campus rallies in 1978 "pero hindi ko nalintindihan" he went for lack of things to do and because "maraming chicks."

Alex, who was then in the UP College of Law after graduating from De la Salle University, has always wanted to be a lawyer and "maybe become my father's (himself a lawyer and a former senator) assistant."

But one hard lesson learned could be all that's needed to make men of boys.

A sophomore in 1979, Lean had found the Philippine Collegian distasteful for being "too political" for a school paper. But he signed up anyway, as a staff writer because he honestly and presumptuously believed that he could write better than the others.

While doing his second assignment on housing (he bungled his first because he did not know enough of capital-intensive industrialization), he discovered that "the BLISS project was not really for the poor who truly needed houses."

What really turned him around was seeing a policeman beating a woman who along with fellow squatters resisted the demolition of their shanties. His voice rising in remembered disbelief, Lean said, "I thought this kind of thing happened only in primitive societies!" In his extreme anger, he never got to write this story either.

Elmer's political awareness began when, as a sophomore, he joined a volunteer group campaigning for the candidates under the party Sandigan ng Mag-aaral at Sambayanan in the student council elections (the first in UP since martial law). When Elmer himself was elected a councilor, his initial limited understanding of campus issues such as tuition fee hikes and the restoration of student councils, broadened into a grasp of national issues.

On the other hand, Alex had his "first real exposure" to politics when in 1978, he and his classmates in the College of Law, campaigned for their professor Jerry Barican. Barican was a Laban candidate in the Interim Batasang Pambansa elections. "I was politically naive, I did not know about American imperialism or feudalism. All I knew that Marcos had to go and Barican then offered some hope for me," Elxa said.

Earlier, Alex had been dabbling in politics as he helped in election campaigns for his father, former Senator Ambrosio Padilla.

For both Elmer and Alex, a common experience was the decisive factor in their political maturity. Both remembered vividly the "Black Thursday," when despite a downpour, about 1,500 UP students marched to the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports in Arroceros on July 24, 1980. They had sought a dialogue with MECS officials on the protest-stricken Education Act but instead were chased away in the rain by truncheon-wielding anti-riot squads.

"I could still remember the face of the policeman who was beating me. He was drunk and grinning as though deriving pleasure from beating me," said Alex, then president of the Law Student Government.

From their respective experiences, Lean, Elmer, and Alex, suddenly understood that their "radical friends" had been right all along and each worked at increasing their political knowledge and involvement.

"Serving the poor, deprived, and oppressed"--the task that each has embraced as his--unavoidably exacted retribution in the form of possible death, insecure financial resources, and yet unfulfilled dreams.

Each has known how it was to run for their lives, to sleep in different houses to escape the noose. As Lean related, "I personally experienced sleeping on kitchen floors with cockroaches scampering by."

Each has known, too, to still depend on their parents principally for money. For instance, Elmer has been ribbed, affectionately though, by his younger siblings that they would now have to support him when he is the eldest among them. Or Alex, a full-fledged lawyer since 1981, but who has a gone full-time into the protest movement, and given up what could have been a lucrative private practice, who said, "I now count every centavo."

Then each has known how to postpone fulfillment of dreams until such time that the "US-Marcos dictatorship has been fully dismantled and the country fully reconstructed." Lean just wants to go home to Navotas and fish and read and play tennis. Elmer, now on his fifth year in Architecture but lacking six academic units, wants to finish his studies and go into private practice. And Alex wants to live in a bungalow somewhere in the mountains and maybe play chess with Lean."

Lean explained, "This is indeed a hard life we have chosen. We perpetually run out of food, of money, and houses. But there is a fate worse than death, if I am going to just sit around. I'm going to suffer more if I keep quiet and not take the risks.

"But I believe in what we're doing and that what we're doing is right. It may be a hard life but we can sleep nights."

Education Minister Dismisses Student Role

Quezon City VERITAS in English 6 Jan 85 p 10

[Article by Patty L. Adversario: "Laya on Students: 'All They Do Is Shout'"]

[Text] An apparent lack of "enlightened leadership" and serious doubts about whether student leaders read and know Shakespeare were among Education Minister Jaime C. Laya's blunt and candid impressions of the quality of student leaders today.

Though the minister refrained from the usual "red-scare tactics" in criticizing the students, he nevertheless came scathingly close to an earlier scolding made by President Marcos on the students' brand of "inelegant English."

Student leaders noted with dismay how government officials have chosen to nitpick again on "form and manner" instead focusing on the "substance" of issues which students have been repeatedly raising.

Laya, however, commended the scope of campus, sectoral, national and international issues in which students have now taken a critical stand unlike before where "our concerns as students focused on the school annual and fraternity hazings." But he did not also spare a few disparaging remarks on how students have pursued the broader issue.

"Where before (during his student days), we had leadership in an enlightened manner which followed the rules of majority while respecting the rights of minority, it now seems that rules of disorder have taken over where decisions are made by noise than by actual head count."

Specifically, he doubts if marches and barricades are the "actual will of the majority." He said that some leaders claim to have the authority to speak for the students because "they know what is good for the majority. To me this is a good definition of dictatorship that you can find anywhere."

The "average" student leader, however, is "sincere," Laya adds, but in his enthusiasm, "he (the student) gets carried away and disregards others who disagree with him."

Battling for other "less disruptive" ways and means by which students can pursue their interests, Laya also mapped out the courses of action which students can take. "The matter of campus issues are where concrete results are possible and can be achieved," he said. Weeding out school administrators who are "crooks" and re-training "incompetent" faculty are activities which to the minister are "feasible, possible and only to be encouraged."

What about the student activists' role in "affecting the advance or retreat of the dictatorship" as asserted by Maria Lourdes Almazan, chairman of the Mag-aaral at Kabataan para sa Kalayaan ng Bayan (MAKABAYAN), a national coalition of student alliances and community-based youth organizations?

Laya has this to say: "Students have a right to be heard but they also have to recognize that theirs is not only one voice...there are other voices. Furthermore, they may not also have studied all the implications of a particular issue yet."

With thinly disguised sarcasm he added. "What can a student do about the World Bank-IMF control in Philippine affairs except march to Malacanang? What can a student do about the US-Marcos dictatorship except do the same. Again, what can he do about police and military brutality except march to Malacanang again and experience it a little bit more?"

On the matter of protests against tuition fee hikes, Laya said "no country in the world guarantees free college education to its students. All that we can do is tell the facts and that's it. They (the students) can raise a tantrum but that's all they will get."

Students must first recognize "what is possible and proceed from there, instead of continually railing against the heavens like King Lear."

Laya doubts whether students who have spent most of their time marching, barricading and shouting can get the allusion made and return the barb equally well.

"While they are wonderful in terms of rousing the masses to frenzy...I am sorry to say that I can argue better in behalf of their proposition than they can," he said.

Laya urged students to get the "full value" of their eight years in high school and college instead of "shortchanging" them with "frequent disruptions."

Recollections of Activist-Turned-Rebel

Quezon City VERITAS in English 6 Jan 85 p 11

[Article as told to Pennie S. Azarcon]

[Text] The Filipino student protest movement could be said to have come of age in the midst of the First Quarter Storm [FQS], those turbulent days of January 1970 that culminated in the Battle of Mendiola and established the youth as a force in the brewing revolution.

Today, most veterans of the FQS find themselves reckoning with the exigencies of daily living, a choice partly necessitated by the imposition of martial law. Some have found comfortable niches in government offices as technocrats or consultants, others have plodded on in teaching jobs, finding in the academic community receptive minds and a semblance of their youthful enthusiasm; others are quietly building their first million in multinational firms; while still others—a great many of them—toll in ordinary jobs like good members of the bourgeoisie.

There are, however, a few who continue fighting the battle they waged in the streets of the city fifteen years ago. Driven to the countryside or forced to borrow into the urban underground network in 1972, they have kept their ideals intact, despite the harshness of life in the hills and while in hiding, and in spite of their own desires for a family life.

One such FQS veteran is Martin, 38, and as he tells his story, he points one way to go for those students of today who wonder if their idealism and commitment will outlive their youth.

It was 1969, the height of the student reform movement. Students were marching in the streets demanding lower tuition fees, academic freedom, autonomy in school publications and an abstract kind of nationalism. You know, like 'Down with imperialism!', that sort.

"Previous to that, in 1963, I think, the first stirrings of student unrest broke into the scene. The political parties in most universities organized a rally to the US Embassy on the issue of parity and the Bell Trade Act. Sen. Lorenzo Tanada was even a guest speaker. The rally was dispersed violently, and it led to the founding of the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) on November 30, 1964.

"At the outset, the KM was parliamentary, reformist-nationalist in character. When I joined it much later, I never considered myself radical or revolutionary--just very much concerned about the legitimacy of the issues.

"My degree of involvement included joining rallies and demos, of course, and taking part in lot of study groups. There we would discuss political theories, the political structures and beliefs of other countries which were also nationalist, even the teachings of Mao. But only as students interested in new learning.

"Now, what really radicalized me?

"I guess it was the violent reaction of the government to our legitimate demands.

"I realized that when people get together for their rights, no matter how legitimate, nate-threaten ang government and the result is suppression. I told myself, eh student rights pa lang ito, pukpukan na; ano pa kaya kung parity rights o national issues na?

"I took part in the battles of Mendiola those tragic days of January 26-30, 1970. Banatan talaga. Na-establish ko na talagang violent ang state, reforms can't work; it was too late for that. At the same time I saw students organized into such a big mass that I realized that kayang lumaban, kayang pabagsakin ang estado. Sa mass action kasi, you get a sense of impending victory, you realize your growing strength, paparami tayo, papalakas tayo, ito na ang oras! A sense of history.

After this, I started organizing. It gave me a higher sense of commitment when everything else becomes secondary. You change your values. Because you're working for a change in the system, you lose all desire to continue working for that system. I resigned from my job--working student ako--so I could have more free time to organize. Tapos nagiging cycle na iyan. Because of deeper commitment, one goes into organizing work; then because of organizing, mas napipino, mas tumatalas ang perception mo sa issues and that results to even deeper commitment. Ang ganda ng feeling, eh.

"Well of course, I started doing organizing work partly dahil akala ko, malapit na ang revolution, na strategic stalemate na. Mostly propa (ganda) lang pala namin iyon, pero okay na rin dahil ang resulta naman, 'you'll work harder para nga mapalapit na talaga.

"The biggest effect of martial law on most student activists was that it crystallized their decision of whether they were ready to go to the countryside, whether they were ready for armed struggle. Most of us had little choice-- it became a necessity dahil sa mga arrests and detentions of even moderate leaders and activists.

It might sound like it's all politics in the movement, but there is space too for personal relationships. For instance, my girlfriend and I were both activists so when martial law was declared, we both went underground [UG]. We got married in the UG because it was the best way to pool our resources--contacts, friends and relatives who can help us.

"Of course I also worry about my kid. I also think, ano ang ipamamana ko sa anak ko pag namatay ako? Kasi siyempre, may budget nga ang collective for a house, food, appliances, but none of these is really yours to bequeath your child. Then I realized, ang family ay part of revolutionary work. Ang panana mo sa anak ay yung revolutionary fervor. You can't communicate all these to the child, but little by little, he'll understand. My 11-year-old boy is now at his post-assassination fever.

Another very personal issue with us is the Aquino assassination. Brutal talaga, it was very callous and shocking. The sheer arrogance of it all. Aquino is no hero of mine, but you don't have to believe in the man to condemn what the Marcos government did to him.

"But on the other hand, the incident did a lot of good: our people had a rude awakening, they realized that it does not pay to be passive, to be over-cautious. It broke the terror effect of martial law and suddenly, there is strong urban mass movement. Marami nang bandang kunilos.

"Also, from the UG's point of view, we don't see the differences of the opposition, rather we note the unity in their demands for genuine industrialization of the country which is both nationalistic and democratic. We're fighting the same dictatorship. There may be various personalities, but on the whole, mas malapad na ang point of unity.

"This is the main reason why I've stayed in the movement all this time. Very strong sa akin ang will to fight against imperialist control in our country; at the same time, I feel that victory is only a matter of time. Unfolding events attest to this."

KB Youth Group Inactive

Quezon City VERITAS in English 6 Jan 85 p 11

[Article by Jesselynn Garcia de la Cruz. "Whatever Happened to the KB?"]

[Text] The nation's "premier youth organization," as the Kabataang Barangay likes to call itself, was willed upon the Filipino youth through a Presidential Decree in 1975 that automatically made members of all 15-21 year-olds in the barangays.

A decade since --after a general election of officers on the barangay level, an election of federation officers on the municipal and city levels, two more presidential decrees that gave it more autonomy and a Batas Pambansa--the KB now boasts of a membership of 10 million youth. They are governed by a National Executive Committee composed of 13 members representing the 12 regions and Metro Manila who decide among themselves when and how to elect the national chairman, and who, for the past six terms have rotated the leadership of the top post among themselves.

While the organizational structure of the Kabataang Barangay, which is "so designed to ensure as wide a reach and popular representation as possible of the 10 million members," and its program of projects and activities is impressive enough, and backed by an annual budget of P8 to P10 million and supported by a foundation headed by the President's eldest daughter, there seems to be no one who can say how effectively this structure is working or how many of these 10 million members benefit from or are even aware of the activities of the organization they have been decreed to belong to.

Sources at the KB national headquarters at Fort Bonifacio claim that the degree of awareness and involvement in the barangay levels is difficult to ascertain. They cannot even say offhand what percentage of the 10 million membership is still actively part of the KB or whether KB councils still exist even in the cities.

It is not difficult to understand this when one finds that even the barangay youth themselves, who are supposed to be members of the KB, are not even certain whether the organization still exists.

"Sandali lang naman nabuhay ang KB dito, pagkatapos ma-elect ang mga officers (in 1975). 'Tapos non, ewan ko na, sa national level na lang yata 'yon e, sila lang,'" a former KB chairman from Paco, Manila told Veritas. She recalls that they did not even know exactly when their terms expired, or whether or not they have been replaced by a new set of council officers.

Even if the local youth councils in the barangays may now be nonexistent, the national headquarters people continued, there are still a host of programs and projects that the national KB engaged in, which are all documented and explained in full-color glossy brochures and magazines. These include national, economic, cultural and sports development programs and special projects such as approtech programs, "KKK ng kabataan," youth farms and international relations programs.

PHILIPPINES

RUC8 COMMANDER PREDICTS MAJOR NPA OFFENSIVE

Quezon City ANC PAHAYAGANG MALAYA in English 5 Jan 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] The New People's Army (NPA) will go on the offensive this year, Brig. Gen. Salvador Mison, Regional Unified Command (RUC) 8 Commander based in Samar, said during an informal interview in Camp Aguinaldo the other day.

Mison said they learned of the NPA plans this year from documents on a captured NPA rebel last month.

He said this was also supported by a statement of an NPA woman commander captured recently from the hills of Samar.

The alleged NPA commander who confirmed the NPA plans was identified as Genalyn Martinez, 23, and an aide-de camp of Rosario Apostol, alias Commander "Sayong", top NPA military commander of the region.

Commander Lyn, according to Mison, revealed a lot of information including the offensive plan of the NPA for the year 1985.

She is now detained at the RUC 8 headquarters in Samar.

The RUC commander said the offensive of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and NPA this year in a preparation for the coming 1986 local and 87 presidential election.

Mison added that for the past few years the rebels have gathered arms and tried to gain the support of the people and will now finally make their move.

Mison, however, said the military is always ever ready to meet them, especially in his area of responsibility.

He claimed that as of this moment the peace and order situation is well under the control by the military in the area and Mison made assurances that they will keep it for a long time.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

RAMOS CITES ATROCITIES, CLAIMS NPA RECRUITING THUGS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] President Marcos was informed yesterday by Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, acting AFP chief of staff, that the New People's Army (NPA) is tapping criminal elements for its manpower needs.

Ramos reported that this recruitment policy of the subversives is apparently the reason for the indiscriminate and brutal nature of NPA depredations that kill or maim innocent civilians.

It may also be an indication that the NPA is hardpressed for more suitable recruits, forcing them to draw from the dregs of society, the acting AFP chief of staff said.

Ramos cited a report from Brig. Gen. Andres B. Ramos, commander of Region Unified Command 4, on Pablo Manalo in Quezon province.

General Ramos said that contrary to the rebels' claim that they are the protectors of the people, their record is "studded with glaring instances of atrocities against civilians and government troops alike."

Ramos said that according to dossier gathered by the RUC 4 commander, Manalo, who bears the aliases of "Totoy," "Mike," "Diva," "Raton," "Eddy," "Eloy," "Jasmin," "Salvador," and "Alzate," was a notorious criminal in Calauag, Quezon, in 1973 involved in pick-pocketing, robbery, and theft.

In the middle part of 1974, Manalo was warned by the subversives about his misdeeds but later used him as a courier. Later that year, he joined the subversives as an active member.

Manalo, according to the report, was involved in a series of violent activities and directly commanded the subversive organization in 19 ambushes of military and police men, five raids on military detachments, the raid on the municipal hall of Basud, Camarines Norte, on June 15, 1983, and the liquidation of 10 PC-INP and CHDF men and 40 civilians.

The latest atrocity attributed to him was the raid on the Army's 42nd IB detachment in barangay Dungawan, Ginayangan, Quezon, on Nov. 24, 1984, which

resulted in the death of a six-month-old baby girl and the wounding of one enlisted man and four soldiers' wives. The subversives also kidnaped the barangay captain and carted away 32 firearms.

At present, Manalo is second secretary of the Bicol border party committee, Southern Luzon commission of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and concurrently secretary of a newly-activated district committee in Eastern Quezon, Ramos said.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

REPORTAGE ON NPA ENCOUNTERS IN MINDANAO

17 Killed in Misamis Incidents

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 6

[Article by Proc Maslog]

[Text] Cagayan de Oro--Seventeen persons, including four terrorists, have died in three separate incidents in Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental, according to reports received here yesterday.

In the first wave of violence, seven out of 10 civilians died in an encounter at around 3:30 p.m. last Thursday between a civilian defense group and armed men, believed to be members of the New People's Army, in the remote barangay of Sta. Cruz, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. One of the terrorists was also killed in the same incident.

The slain civilians were identified as Godofredo Bulalacao, 42; Dodong Atil, 23; Dadong Atil, 24; Toto Donasa, 26; Portillo Libunta, 36; Toto Tayurong, 36, and Connie Tambu, 38. Wounded were Nelso Baldoy, 25, and Elbert Bulalacao, 16. Only Paquito Balos, 33, escaped unhurt.

According to sketchy reports, the civilians were on the way home after patrolling the hinterlands when they were ambushed. They returned fire, and the survivors claimed that one terrorist was killed while another was hurt.

Balos and Baldoy were able to reach Claveria, where they informed the military about the incident. Soldiers later retrieved the bodies of the dead.

In the second incident, four armed men, believed to be members of the New People's Army, were killed and two others were captured in a clash between the armed men and government troopers in Calamba, Misamis Occidental last Wednesday afternoon.

Belated reports reaching this city said that the slain men were identified as Allen Sulabillo, alias Kumander Eddie, Eliezar Balunit, Raul Taclob, and Marilyn Maslog. Captured by the government troopers, led by 1st Lt. Jose Jusay, were Rufo Pasugod and Precy Paridecasas. Recovered from them were a .22 cal. Magnum revolver, a .38 cal. revolver, a shotgun, fragmentation grenades and a first-aid kit.

And in the third incident, five civilians were shot to death by unidentified armed men in barangay Kalangahan, Lugait, Misamis Oriental at around 7:30 p.m. last Wednesday.

Only two of the victims were identified. They were Lorimer Balicuan and Boy Ramos.

According to reports received here, the five were on board their motorcycles when they were stopped by the armed men. They were told to line up. Then they were gunned down.

Agusan Del Sur--Eight suspected members of the New People's Army were killed and an undetermined number of their companions wounded in an encounter with the military at sitio Alo, Barangay Balutakay, Bangsalan, Davao del Sur last Dec. 24.

In a belated report, Major Eduardo Santiago, commanding officer of the 27th Infantry Division, said the group's leader, identified only as commander Tresse, was killed in the 30-minute firefight.

Troopers Slay 8 NPA Suspects

Davao City THE MINDANAO MIRROR-BULLETIN in English 31 Dec 84-6 Jan 85 pp 1, 6

[Text] Eight suspected members of the New People's Army (NPA) were slain in an encounter with government troopers in sitio Lasang, San Roque, Koronadal, South Cotabato recently.

At the same time, a government "asset" or informer and a militiaman bodyguard of Koronadal Mayor Ismael Sueno were separately gunned dead by hit-men of the NPA early this month.

The government informer was identified as Benedicto Salcedo, 58. He was slain by a 12-man NPA group composed of seven men and five women right inside his residence.

Salcedo was suspected by his NPA assailants to have informed the authorities about the presence of rebels in his area.

The slain ICHDF, on the other hand, was gunned down by two suspected NPAs in downtown Koronadal early last Saturday morning.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

UNKNOWN GUNMAN KILLS 'CHRISTIAN' BMA REBEL

Davao City THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR in English 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 6

[Text] Pantukan, Davao del Norte--A suspected member of the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) was shot to death by an unidentified gunman about 50 meters away from the police station of Pantukan town this province last night.

Police identified the victim as one Rafael Ledesma, 21; allegedly a Christian member of the separatist group. A bullet from a .45 caliber pistol hit his nape and plowed to his brain and blew off at the right eye-brown. He died on the spot.

According to Lt. Abraham C. Catre, Pantukan police station commander, the victim who was once a member of the local militia before he was recruited by the BMA was on his way home from the poblacion proper when shot from behind.

The still unknown gunman, Catre said, was apparently waiting for the victim as evidenced by the many cigarette butts scattered near the place where the victim was gunned down.

Probers theorized that the suspect must have a standing grudge with the victim, however, the possibility that he was a rub-out victim by the Sparrow Unit of the New People's Army was not not discounted.

Meanwhile, a pretty 17-year-old student was killed when the the bicycle she was riding was sideswiped by a speeding passenger jeepney along Km. 58, barangay Apokon Tagum, this province last Wednesday afternoon.

The victim, Virgie L. Espillarga, first year college student and a resident of Apokon expired before reaching the hospital.

Cpl. Cirilo Y. Palaca, officer of the case said the rear tire of the bicycle was hit by the bumper of the jeepney when victim crossed the lane.

The victim was tossed and thrown several meters away upon impact before she landed headon the concrete pavement of the highway.

The driver Nicanor B. Villavelez surrendered to the police after the accident. He was charged of homicide thru reckless imprudence and is locked at the municipal jail.

An MNLF commander was slain while three of his companions were captured following an encounter Thursday, this week, between joint intelligence operatives of the South Cotabato PC/INP Provincial Command, R2 Division of PC/INP Regional Command 11, NISA Sub-Station and the Southwestern Force, PA, with a group of armed men in Gen. Santos City.

The report of Col. Andres M. Superable, South Cotabato Provincial Commander to Brig. Gen. Dionisio S. Tan-Gatue, Jr., RECOM 11 Commander, said the government troops encountered the armed men--suspected to have been engaged in extortion activities--in the vicinity of Acharon Beach, Brgy Labangal Gen. Santos City, resulting to an exchange of fire.

The shootout lasted after some five minutes when one of the armed men was hit fatally. He was identified as Jib Caluyan alias Comdr Beron, deputy MNLF commander. Recovered from his body were a fragmentation handgrenade and a caliber .38 revolver.

Captured by the troopers were three companions of the slain commander identified as Landasan Daud alias Comdr. Danny Flores/Rico, Florante Roxas alias Boy Mondragon and Ting Cali alias Ting.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

ARMY-MNLF FIREFIGHT KILLS 12 IN NORTH COTABATO

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Hernani Pastolero]

[Text] Two sergeants of the Philippine army infantry brigade and ten other rebels were killed in a fierce gunbattle between government troopers and some 50 heavily armed men of the Moro National Liberation Front in Barangay Dunguan, Aleosan, North Cotabato the other day.

Killed in action were Sergeants A. Lacuna and a still unidentified trooper with the same rank while wounded seriously was one Sgt. Panigon. Ten others were allegedly killed in the rebel side during the fight which lasted about one-hour gunfight.

Reports disclosed the 35th IB had received information that a group of MNLF rebels have invaded barangay Dunguan at Aleosan.

Accompanied by members of the civilian home defense force from Midsayap a neighboring town of Aleosan, the government troopers immediately proceeded to the area in full-combat gears.

Upon reaching the barangay, however, they were fired upon by the rebels who had perched themselves in the hilly portions of the roadside.

Two soldiers were fatally hit in the first bursts of gunfire. The soldiers and the CHDFs returned fire and a spirited gunbattle ensued killing 10 of the rebels.

The rebels retreated, after realizing that they were no match for the fire power displayed by the AFP troopers.

The MNLF men were led by one Commander Untad who operate in the marshy areas of Pagalungan, Maguindanao.

The AFP soldiers also lost one caliber .45 pistol and seven pieces of magazines of M16 armalite rifles and 20 cap assemblymen during the skirmishes. The rebels allegedly fled on foot to the marshy parts of the area which is leading towards Pagalungan.

PHILIPPINES

REPORT ON MALAYA WRITER'S PLEA FOR HANDGUN RIGHTS

Davao City PEOPLE'S DAILY FORUM in English 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 6

[Article by Ed Fernandez]

[Text] "Every citizen 18 years old and above should have the right to own a gun, to protect himself, his family and his home."

This was proposed by Armando J. Malay, Ang Pahayasanang MALAYA columnist and regarded as the old man in Philippine journalism, in a column he wrote the other day, January 4.

This proposal came as "bold and concrete platforms" in addition to the 7 "principles" drawn up by some leaders to the opposition. According to Malay the 7 principles drawn up are nothing but measly profession of beliefs in things we cannot quarrel about: dignity of the human persons, freedom of conscience, national interest, free and honest elections, and others.

Malay said that the man who owns a home, no matter how modest, or who takes home a wage or a salary, no matter how small, should have the means to protect that home or that money, the same as the rich man or the millionaire. "Right now not everybody can legally bear arms. Only if you possess a certain amount of property can you be licensed to possess, say, a revolver or a pistol", Malay underscored.

On the insinuation that a lot of crimes occur because it's mostly the criminally minded who have the arms, whether licensed or not. "If every man or woman legally keeps a gun in his house or in his person to protect himself or his property, the criminals would not be so daring", the MALAYA columnist emphasized.

Reacting on the issue of police protection and on the question: "What is the police for?", Malay answered the question with question: "Well, is the police always around when you need them most? Isn't the crime rate so high today precisely because the people do not have the means to protect themselves?"

Malay, in his January 4 column in the Pahayasanang MALAYA, appealed to those interested to run for president and to those who want to run during the local elections to consider his proposal and study it thoroughly before regarding it as "outrageous".

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

MT DIWATA GOLD CAMP SITUATION PROFILE

Perth THE WEST AUSTRALIAN in English 28 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by T. R. Lonsner]

[Text] Tens of thousands of Filipinos have abandoned traditional livelihoods and headed for the mountains to answer perhaps the oldest and most irresistible call to fortune seekers--gold.

In the past year, a shanty town housing 70,000 to 100,000 people has sprung up on a forested hillside in Davao del Norte Province in the southern island of Mindanao.

But Mt Diwata is a boom town in stark contrast to the economic depression gripping most of the rest of the Philippines.

"I make more money here than I did teaching," said 47-year-old miner Geraldo Daquio, "but I don't like this place.

Dangerous

"It's dangerous and we're struggling every minute. There are every kind of people here. But as long as there is still gold and we can have a good income, we will stay."

Most miners earn \$3.50 to \$5 a day. Minimum pay for the agricultural jobs many left behind was only 90 cents a day, and others were simply unemployed.

Before a tortuously-winding dirt road was cut to the 1.6km-high mining area, the only way up was an exhausting day-long climb.

Haphazard wooden buildings line the city's main boulevard, a 3km lane of mud usually no more than two metres wide. More ramshackle structures cling precariously to the mountainside.

Motorcycles and small tractors chug and sputter through the muck, hauling people, freshly mined ore and sundry other goods. Hundreds of labourers stoop under large timbers, shouting to others to give way.

Behind it all, 24 hours a day, is the roar of diesel engines and the thump of gold ore being crushed in the ballmills they power.

But for all the frenetic surface activity, the real work is underground. "For every man you see here," said a miner as he swept his arm across a slope as busy as an anthill, "there are three people working underground."

The ore gouged from hundreds of tunnels is hauled up manually, then milled and sluiced. Gold dust in the water is retrieved by amalgamating it with mercury in simple pans, then melting the mercury out with blow torches. The extraction process is crude and the product impure.

Mt Diwata is a small-timers' boom. Sweat and ingenuity mostly take the place of capital: "If we could only get one jackhammer," the eyes of the leader of one group of miners lit up, "then we could really make some money."

With the miners and panners have come hordes of people to set up shops and restaurants and businesses or make their fortunes in other ways.

Several makeshift, wooden-benched video halls offer new films daily and gambling is rife, with organized bingo and more spontaneous card games carrying high stakes.

"Hospitality girls" have not neglected the needs of Mt Diwata's mostly male population, and the prices they demand reflect the long trek to reach the men.

Any diversion from the squalid conditions is welcome. Sanitation is virtually non-existent, and there is fear of epidemics of cholera and typhoid.

Primitive tunnelling techniques and sometimes amateurish timbering cost many men their lives in collapses. Conservative estimates reckon that 300 men have died underground over the past year. The real number will never be known.

The dangers remain, but thousands of men still descend daily through unventilated, candlelit shafts and tunnels which honeycomb the mountain.

Thieves and hold-ups abound. Military men assigned to maintain order regularly extort protection money, either in cash or in gold. Miners describe it as "representation money," and accept it as a painful, but inevitable business expense.

But the military is not the sole holder of that title. One miner shrugged: "Some are military--them we know. Others say he NPA (members of the communist New Peoples Army), some are Moslem (rebels). We give them some money and they all leave us alone. For now, there is enough for everyone."

There have been no open clashes over protection rackets at Mt Diwata. At a smaller gold site nearby, 10 people were reportedly killed in an October gun-battle between communist and Moslem rebels over graft.

For the small-scale miners, harder times lie ahead. The ore seams near the surface are being played out, and the price of gold remains depressed. The land they work is officially the concession of two big logging concerns, and there are influential claimants to the mineral rights.

The miners have the numbers, and threaten to resist eviction threatened by government ministries in the capital, Manila.

But the lure of money--if not easy money--still draws new arrivals who each day step stiffly from jammed jeeps after a racking three-hour journey from the nearest highway.

CSO: 4200/466

PHILIPPINES

ISMU URGES BANK TO PAY LAID OFF AUTO WORKERS

Quezon City ANC PAMAYAGANG MALAYA in English 5 Jan 85 pp 1, 6

[Text] The militant labor group Kilusang Mayo Uno yesterday urged the Philippine National Bank to pay laid-off workers of the Delta Motors Corp. and Philippine Blooming Mills, even as it urged the national government to obtain the cash requirement of the PNB from the proceeds of the newly acquired International Monetary Fund bridge loan.

By way of moral and legal obligations, PNB must bear full responsibility in the grant of the financial claims by at least 1,500 of the more than 3,000 work force of the foreclosed Delta Motor Corp., ISMU said.

The claims amounting to P20 million are in the form of separation pay, back wages, and accrued leave credits of the now unemployed workers.

Assailing the PNB for "resorting to deceiving tactics and empty promises" in dealing with the dismissed workers, ISMU noted that the Delta Motor case has likewise happened to the workers of the PEM who are yet to receive their rightful claims, amounting to some P30 million, after the firm's closure in 1981.

Still in the labor front, employees of the Allied Banking Corporation walked out of their offices Jan. 3 and declared what could be the first strike in 1985.

Striking workers protested the deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiation as management refused to budge from its P600 wage increase offer as against the union's demand of P1,200 for three years covering the CBA.

Tommas Gonzalo, president of the Allied Bank Employees Union (ABEU) said the employees have been pushed to the wall and had no other alternative in the dispute but to stage a strike. The union filed a strike notice on Nov. 26 last year.

Meanwhile, the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) declared through its president Jose P. Usali, Jr., that all their affiliate organizations, whose mass membership totals to some 10,000 bank employees, have expressed their support to ABEU. The national union is said to be on call for mobilization to exert added pressure to the Allied Bank management.

PHILIPPINES

LACK OF RAW MATERIALS CLOSES OVER 2,000 FIRMS IN 1984

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 6 Jan 85 p 20

[Article by Ellen Samaniego]

[Text] Business shutdowns last year reached 2,134, 68.4 percent more than the firms closed the previous year, reports submitted to the labor ministry's statistics service (LSS) showed.

Production slowdowns during the period affected a total of 86,186 workers who were either temporarily or permanently retrenched as against the previous year's 75,428 manpower, the report noted.

Of the 2,134 firms which filed reports with the LSS, 193 companies completely stopped their operations. About 1,939 business establishments were only temporarily closed due to lack of raw materials, high production cost, depressed market demand and the restricted dollar allocation. Workers affected by the permanent closures of these firms reached 36,705, more than double the previous year's 18,047 workers, based on the LSS figures.

The temporary suspension of operations, on the other hand, resulted in the termination of 27,391 workers or 41.6 percent lower than the 46,862 layoffs recorded in 1983.

The average duration of workers being laid off temporarily, was 11 weeks compared to 9 weeks average in 1983.

The number of private businesses forced to reduce their worktime schedules due to economic reasons sharply in 1984 rose to 310, twice the level the previous year.

Workers affected correspondingly jumped from 15,057 in 1983 to 29,910 last year according to reports filed with the LSS.

A breakdown of the industry sectors showed that manufacturing had the most shutdowns as the total number of workers adversely hit remained above the 50,000-mark over the last two years.

Other affected industries include textile and wearing apparel with 14,730, food sector with 7,664; fabricated metal products with 6,260; transport equipment with 3,442; wholesale and retail trade with 5,977, construction with 5,777, and mining and quarrying with 5,711.

Of the total number of layoffs during the year, Metro Manila accounted for roughly 67 percent with 55,752 workforce involved, according to the report.

CSO: 4200/466

THAILAND

COLUMNIST ON SRV CHARGES OF U.S., THAI, PRC SUBVERSION

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 18 Dec 84 p 2

[Around the World column by Udon Wongthapthim: "Soviet Guns, Vietnamese Shells"]

[Text] During the prolonged fighting along the Thai border between Vietnamese troops and the Cambodian resistance forces, Vietnam has charged that Thailand, the United States and China are supporting the rebels who are trying to topple the Vietnamese government.

But even before Vietnam made this charge against the Thai and U.S. governments, TASS News Agency attacked the United States and Thailand, charging that the United States is using Thailand as a tool to stir up trouble in Southeast Asia. It said that this has created instability. And it pointed out that the United States has stepped up military operations in this region. Besides this, the report also said that the United States has pressured Thailand to accept more military aid in order to force Thailand to become the frontline country in the struggle against the Indochina countries.

Vietnam followed the lead of the Soviet Union and charged that Thailand and the United States are supporting the rebels who are trying to topple the Vietnamese government. They also charged that China is supplying weapons. These are clever attacks on its three enemies, the purpose of which is to drive home the point that the United States, Thailand and China are evil countries.

But actually, it is difficult to determine the truth of Vietnam's charge since the countries attacked, particularly the United States, refuse to comment on this.

Vietnam published reports on the arrest of approximately 100 people whom it claims are rebels. Some of these people have been charged with engaging in espionage activities and committing acts of destruction. Vietnam also charged that these rebel forces have an operations base in the Mekong Delta and that they have received weapons training from Thai soldiers. What is very serious is that they have charged that Lt Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the deputy chief of staff of the army, is

the person behind this plan. They have also charged that the headquarters of the rebels who are trying, with strong U.S. backing, to topple the PRK government is located in Thailand.

After concluding its attack on Thailand, it turned to the United States, charging that Mr Donald B. Coleman, the deputy secretary at the U.S. embassy in Thailand, and four other U.S. officials serve as links to the rebels in opposing the government.

As for the charge that the headquarters of the Cambodian rebels is located in Bangkok, Mr Saowanit Khongsiri, the director-general of the Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that this charge is ridiculous and that this is not the first time that Vietnam has made such charges. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied Vietnam's charges, saying that the charges were groundless and not worthy of comment.

Vietnam has made such charges because it wants to wage a propaganda war to make the people of the world think that Thailand, China and the United States are backing the rebels. But as already mentioned, it is the Soviet Union that has sent weapons to Vietnam, telling them where to fire to hit "three birds with one round," that is, Thailand, the United States and China.

11943

CSO: 4207/98

THAILAND

CARTOON ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW

Bangkok WIWAT in Thai 15-21 Dec 84 p 3

[Cartoon]



Key:

1. Outdated laws
2. Anti-Communist Act
3. Social pressures
4. Human rights in Thailand

11943

CSO: 4207/98

THAILAND

COLUMNIST URGES LENIENCY FOR COMMUNIST SUSPECTS

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 15 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Withayakon Chiangkun: "The Case of Achan Chonthira, Do Not Imprison an Infant"]

[Text] I heard that Achan Chonthira Satyawattana, one of 22 communist suspects, is expected to give birth around 17 December. Unless she is released or allowed out on bail, it means that her innocent child will be born in jail.

Achan Chonthira intends to raise her child herself, which is her legal right and which is proper from the standpoint of the baby's health. Doctors now realize and are trying to inform others that mother's milk is the best food for an infant. Psychologists recognize that it is the mother who is best suited to raising the child. But a dirty jail where germs abound and where there are no means of killing the germs is a terrible place [to raise a baby]. But separating a mother from her child in order to raise it in a cleaner and more convenient place is just as bad or even worse.

Thus, the thing that Prime Minister Prem should do as soon as possible is release Achan Chonthira on bail or simply allow her to go free. Delaying the decision will only tarnish the government's image. And if anything should happen to her child, the damage to the government's image will be even greater.

Being a political suspect does not mean that the person is a criminal. It just means that the person holds views different from those of the government and that the person opposes the government.

Civilized countries treat female prisoners who are pregnant better than we do in Thailand. But in this case, Achan Chonthira is just a suspect. She has not been found guilty by a court. Why is she being treated like a criminal?

I don't understand why Thai society, which is a Buddhist society and which has compromised on many issues, such as granting pardons to the 1 April rebels and other rebels and to several thousand communists and members to the communist front, is acting so cold toward Achan Chonthira and her child. I am, all civilized Thais, regardless of their political viewpoint, to give attention to this problem. I call on those who have power to give urgent attention to this matter. In particular, women's groups, children's protection groups, doctors, scholars, students, intellectuals and religious groups, which should be more directly involved than other groups, should be helping more by making appeals.

Sadly, few humanitarian appeals have been made on behalf of Achan Chonthira. Many people are afraid that this will draw attention to them. They are afraid that voicing support for her will cause people to think that they are accomplices of hers, that is, that they, too, are communists. But that does not have anything to do with this.

Achan Chonthira's case is clearly a humanitarian case. The child that will be born has no political ideology and so should not have to be in jail.

Some activists have said that they have not made an appeal on behalf of Achan Chonthira because that would be showing special favor to her while other female prisoners who were pregnant were treated just as she is being treated now.

But this is not a good excuse for failing to take action. Because actually, we should appeal for better treatment for all female suspects who are pregnant.

The reason that I am making an appeal on behalf of Achan Chonthira is that this is a case that I am directly aware of. And it is a political case, which is different from ordinary criminal cases.

I hope that Achan Chonthira's case will serve as an example in revising the laws on female prisoners who are pregnant.

I do not know Achan Chonthira personally, but I have followed her work and feel that she is an important scholar. In the language of economists, she is a valuable national resource. I say that without hesitation.

As a member of Thai society, a citizen who pays taxes, a teacher and writer who loves knowledge and truth, I am very ashamed about what Thai society is now doing to her. Thus, I call on everyone to take an interest in this problem. I appeal to the government to solve this problem as quickly as possible. Otherwise, this will make a lie of the statement that Thai society is composed of sympathetic people of a Buddhist nature who are united and who always turn to one another whenever something happens.

11941

CO: 4207/141

THAILAND

ISOC SOURCES ON NEW NORTHEAST COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Bangkok CHAT ATHIPATAI in Thai 16-22 Dec 84 pp 19, 20

[Article: "Exposing a Secret CPT Plan for Cross-Border Revolution"]

[Text] Recently, Col Prasong Huanpraphai, the chief of the Civil Affairs Section, Second Army Area, talked with reporters about the activities of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the northeast. He said that the CPT is definitely finished. But what is worrisome is the Phak Mai (New Party), which is known as the "Thai People's Revolutionary Movement" (TPRM). The Second Army Area is keeping constant watch on their activities.

In order to find out more about this, CHAT ATHIPATAI has tried to follow the reports about the activities of this group in the area of responsibility of the Second Army Area.

"We know that the Phak Mai has about 1,000 armed men and a united front of almost 10,000 people. But these are in Laos near the border between the north and northeast. They have political training schools at Pak Krading in Khammouan Province and in Khong District in Sithakone Province."

A military news source in the Region 2 ISOC (Internal Security Operations Command) told CHAT ATHIPATAI about the present activities of this group. He said that they send forces into Thailand to gather information and get people to join the united front rather than to establish operations bases.

Besides this, he said that armed Phak Mai forces are carrying on activities rather openly along the border near Uttaradit and Phetchabun. At the end of this past rainy season, in the northeast, they carried on activities in Loei, Nakhon Phanom, Mukdahan and the northern part of Ubon Ratchathani provinces. During the rainy season, they conduct political training seminars for operatives.

An internal document of the Region 2 ISOC states that the TPRM originated following the split within the CPT in 1979. Members of the CPT and part of the united front announced that they were enemies of the CPT.

Initially, they joined together to form a new party, using such strange names as the Northeastern Thai National Liberation [Party] and the Siam Communist Party. But they did not succeed in forming a party since they did not have ideological unity or a large enough mass base.

Then, Mr Thongpak Phiangket, Mr Theotphum Chaidi, Mr Bunsong Chalethon and members of the united front returned to Thailand. Those who were left joined together to form this movement, which is composed of four groups:

1. A number of CPT members and their united front.
2. Friends and relatives of those who have joined the movement.
3. A few students left from that period.
4. Lao officials who are providing support.

At present, it is thought that Mr Dunyen Wethon, a former MP from Ubon Ratchathani Province, Mr Dan Howian, alias S. Khwang, a former member of the CPT, and Col Khamban, the former commander of the 51st Regiment, Lao Army, are the leaders of this movement. CPT main-force units are still present in the north.

A military intelligence officer with the Second Army Area said that in the past, this movement played a very low-key role. But when the CPT lost influence in the northeast, this movement became the new hope of those misguided people who want to destroy the nation. But so far, this movement has attracted the support of only a few people. The people know that these people are the underlings of other countries that want to harm our country.

"From what we have learned, the CPT is trying to send senior members to negotiate with Lao officials in an effort to gain financial support and weapons. Besides this, several groups that have split away from the CPT have asked for support from Laos. But Laos has refused to help them since it does not trust them," said this military intelligence officer.

The reason why the TPRM in Laos has not welcomed old friends from the CPT or even the CPT is that this group fears that these people will try to get money and weapons without abandoning the line of Mao Tse-tung. And they are not sure whether those who have come and made contact are really secret agents of the Thai government.

Thus, the activities of this group are highly secret. They have not expanded their activities in a sensational way like the CPT did. It is thought that very few Thais have joined their united front. Thus, this group has to rely on the villagers who live along the Thai-Lao border in Uttaradit, Phetchabun and Loei provinces. These people are an important support force.

The document of the Region 2 ISOC points out that the full potential of the Phak Mai will be manifested only if the situation in Indochina changes in such a way that Vietnam can use this group as a factor to launch a national war against Thailand. At that point, these foreign revolutionary forces will invade and occupy Thailand.

The activities of this group are still very limited. But this does not mean that the hopes of these pro-Soviet revolutionaries are farfetched. However, spreading rumors that cause panic may adversely affect the participants in national development who have rejected both the CPT and the Phak Mai. We should be very careful about this since we are struggling against the motto "revolution is an export commodity."

Note: The following are excerpts from the internal document of the Region 2 ISOC that concern the Thai People's Revolutionary Movement:

Analysis of Thai society:

This is a neocolonialist society that is controlled by monopoly capitalists. Remnants of feudalism remain.

General line:

1. To eliminate U.S. and Chinese influence in Thailand.
2. To topple the feudalists, land owners, oppressors and reactionary government.
3. To build up the state power of the people.

Revolutionary line:

Both the urban and rural areas are strategic areas. The struggle in the cities must be coordinated with the struggle in the rural areas.

Political and military operations must be coordinated.

The international line holds to the principles of proletarian internationalism.

Organizational line:

The TPRM is a proletarian revolutionary movement that is composed of laborers, who are in the vanguard, farmers, who make up the bulk of the forces, small capitalists, intellectuals and students, who are important forces, and progressive national capitalists, political parties and political groups, which are important support forces.

11943

SM: 4207/88

THAILAND

POLICE, MOBSTERS COOPERATE IN SURAT THANI, MUKDAHAN

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 21 Dec 84 pp 1, 2

[Articles: "Fourth Army Area Sends Troops to Help the Governor Eliminate the Dark Influences in Phra Saeng District"]

[Text] The governor of Surat Thani Province told villagers that government officials must stop acting improperly. He ordered the immediate closure of a casino in front of the Phra Saeng District Headquarters. The commanding general of the Fourth Army Area is ready to deal with the influential people and has sent forces to provide protection and to stop the revolutionary war. Seri Temiyawet disclosed the behavior of corrupt police officials and a well-known "hi-low" MP.

A MATICHON reporter in Surat Thani Province reported that at 1200 hours on 20 December, Lt Gen Wanchai Chitchamnong, the commanding general of the Fourth Army Area, and Mr Nipon Bunyaphatso, the governor of Surat Thani Province, met with people from Phra Saeng District at the Phra Saeng District headquarters in order to explain the policies and ask for their help in eliminating the dark powers in the wake of the recent death of Mr Napha Kanchanakirana, the district officer in Phra Saeng.

Lt Gen Wanchai said that the Fourth Army Area will help the province eliminate the dark powers from Phra Saeng District in order to bring about justice and bring peace and happiness to the people. The Fourth Army Area's relief unit will be sent to eliminate the revolutionary war factors. On this occasion, Police Lt Col Manun Sonthong, the chief inspector at the provincial police station in Phra Saeng District, made an appeal to the commanding general of the Fourth Army Area since influential people have made threats on his life just as they did with the Phra Saeng district officer. This is because the police seized a shipment of timber that had been smuggled in from Krabi Province. The influential people asked that this timber be returned to them. But he refused and so death threats have been made. Lt Gen Wanchai said that there is no cause for alarm. The army area will send CPM [civil-police-military unit] No 43 to provide support. One company of soldiers will be stationed in the district in order to eliminate the dark powers.

support. I would really like to remain here until the next election in order to see what the results will be," said Police Col Seri. As for Mr Chaleo suing him, he intends to file a countersuit for being charged with making the arrest because of a conflict with administrative officials.

11941

CSO: 4207/101

THAILAND

CO-ORDINATE REPORTS ON CROWN PRINCE, PREM MEETING

REUTERS LAX THAI 18 THAI 27 DEC 84 PP 7G, 21

ARTICLES: "Prem and Reports of a Coup: 'I Am Not a Coup Maker'"

THAI 18 THAI 27 DEC 84 PP 7G, 21
A news report stated that at 2250 hours on 10 December, the crown prince, in military uniform, made a personal visit to Gen Prem Tinsulanonda at Gen Prem's Sinsakongkarn home.

This visit by the crown prince took place after Gen Prem returned home from a party on Constitution Day. When the crown prince arrived, Gen Prem, who was dressed in a blue warm-up suit, welcomed him.

The report stated that while walking along the path around the yard of Gen Prem's house, the crown prince had a personal chat with Gen Prem. Then at 2345 hours, Gen Prem asked him to come into the house. The crown prince stayed another 30 minutes and then left, saying good-bye at the large front door. He then got in his car, which he had asked to wait for him, and left at 0015 hours.

Prem: "Not a Coup Maker"

The next morning, Gen Prem was questioned by reporters about the personal visit by the crown prince. Normally, he exercises every day. If he does not have a chance to exercise in the early evening, he takes a short walk after dinner. The crown prince knew this and so radioed him that he would join him for a walk that evening. And so Gen Prem went to greet him.

During their walk, the crown prince talked about several things. He then talked about the visit by the king of Nepal. Besides that, he discussed various other matters. He talked mostly about matters that are worrying him because of the king's illness.

The crown prince has many royal duties that he must perform in place of the king. He discussed these things with me," said Gen Prem.

THAI

END 42077/84

The result is that the government has agreed to take money from the Farmers' Welfare Fund, which is money that comes from the rice premiums collected from the farmers, and lend it to the rice mills at a low rate of interest, that is, 9 percent a year, or 0.75 percent a month.

The government has stipulated that rice mills that want to borrow money from this fund must pay the farmers at least 3,000 baht per kwian for their rice. This price is calculated for the next 3 months. That is, if farmers want to sell rice today based on this program, they will receive an advance payment of 1,500 baht per kwian from the mills; they can collect the remaining 1,500 baht per kwian 3 months later. But at the end of the 3 months, if market prices are higher than 3,000 baht, the farmers can bargain with the mills. But how much of the excess will the mills pay? How much above 1,500 baht will they go? As for the 1,500 baht per kwian that the mills pay the day they receive the rice, the mills can borrow that money from the Farmers' Welfare Fund, which is money that is collected from the farmers.

You are probably thinking, 3 months from now, will the market price reach 3,000 baht? If it doesn't, will the mills be at risk? And will the mills cheat the farmers? My guess, and I may be wrong, is that the mills have calculated things very carefully and do not feel that there is any risk. Since rice is now selling for 2,850-2,900 baht in the Central Region, unless something unusual happens, rice prices will definitely climb to 3,000 baht within the next 3 months. If the mills pay 2,850 baht in cash now, by the time the storage charge of 50-60 baht a month is added in, in 3 months the price will already be 3,000 baht. But if something does happen and the price does not reach 3,000 baht, the farmers who sold their rice based on this program can forget about collecting the money owed them.

Another reason why I feel confident that rice prices will be above 3,000 baht per kwian 3 months from now is that, as you undoubtedly remember, the government devalued the baht on 5 October. Before it announced this, several major exporters sold more than 1 million tons of rice to other countries in advance. This rice must be delivered between December and February. When they sold this rice, they repaid the money owed to the commercial banks. Stated simply, they borrowed money from the banks in advance. At that time, the exchange rate was 23 baht to the dollar. But in selling rice abroad following the devaluation, the new contracts will use the new exchange rate, that is, 27 baht to the dollar. Thus, the domestic price of paddy should rise somewhat. The mills have such data and so they are not afraid of committing themselves to a price of 3,000 baht per kwian for the next 3 months. They think that rice prices will be at that level.

You might argue that selling rice based on this program is tantamount to being paid only 1,500 baht per kwian and loaning the remaining amount to the mills for 3 months interest free. In response, I would like to say that that is not the only benefit that the mills will

receive. Because normally, if the mills have to borrow money from the bank to pay the 1,500 baht per kwian when the rice is delivered to them, they have to pay interest of at least 18 percent a year, or 1.5 percent a month. But with this program, they can borrow money from the Welfare Fund at only 0.75 percent a month. This, too, benefits the mills. At this rate of interest for 3 months, they make approximately 34 baht per kwian.

But do not view everything in a negative way. If the rice mills act honestly, that is, if they purchase rice based on the program and pay 1,500 baht per kwian in advance and if rice prices 3 months from now are higher and they pay according to the higher price, the farmers will benefit, too. That is, farmers will receive 1,500 baht that they can use for those 3 months without having to pay interest. But farmers must be careful that the mills do not assess the rice at a lower grade than it really is or lower the price by claiming that the rice is wetter than it should be. Also, farmers should not rely on government or farmer representatives. Because in the past, many of the representatives from these two groups have been accomplices of the mills.

The thing that I am worried about at present and that I would like to tell you so that you monitor the actions of the mills is that many of the mills might try to play a trick. They may take rice that they have purchased from farmers in the ordinary way and claim that the rice was purchased based on this program. They could then ask to borrow money from the Farmers' Welfare Fund at the lower interest rate. This would be easy for the mills. Because in the past, the mills cheated like this during the period when the Marketing Organization for Agriculture purchased rice. They are still just as clever. Most of the mills share some of their profits with the government officials and farm leaders who are supposed to ensure that the rice really did come from the farmers. The mills would benefit from this without having to do anything during those 3 months.

Such measures will not help increase rice prices at all. Because next year, rice yields will probably remain about the same. The rice mills not participating in the program will purchase the same amounts as in the past. The mills participating in the program will probably purchase less rice and use rice from the mill to obtain cash or borrow money at a low rate of interest. And so this will not have much of an effect. The mills in the program will profit from not having to pay interest. Since most mills will have to pay interest, they will have to pay lower prices for the paddy. The mills in the program will buy at the lower prices, too, since there is no reason for them to pay a higher price than the other mills. Furthermore, the number of mills participating in the program is less than the number not participating. Thus, having the participating mills purchase rice from the farmers will not help the farmers very much.

I have to apologize for the fact that this letter deals only with unpleasant matters. The money from the Welfare Fund is money that came from the farmers. I have pointed out how this money flows out. We have discussed the fact that the government should not collect this tax since doing so causes rice prices to fall. Some people claim that the money can be put to use. But it is strange that in Thailand, people "walk" to do good deeds but "run" to make profits. (I borrowed this phrase from a colleague.)

Before I close this letter, colleagues at the Tha Phrachan office asked me to ask you two questions:

First, do you think that this policy, which allows the mills to purchase rice by paying half first and which claims to benefit the farmers, should continue to be implemented? If it is understood that the government must do this for its political survival, spending as little of the farmers' money as possible, the government should limit this to a narrow circle and be very strict, shouldn't it? Actually, this may be done just to save the face of people in government circles and to quiet those who like to "make noise." When the price of rice increases, as is will, they will take the opportunity to abolish this policy. Do you think that that is right?

Second, many people do not understand how you and the other farmers could have selected representatives who would agree with measures that would open loopholes that benefit the mills. When we talked together, you and the other villagers did not say whether you had representatives working to preserve your interests. Would you please write a letter and tell me how the farmers select their representatives and whether the farmers have a chance to monitor the actions of their representatives on various matters?

11943

CSO: 4207/99

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

3RD MILITARY REGION GENERAL ON RECENT ECONOMIC, DEFENSE EFFORTS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Oct 84 pp 2, 3

[Article by Lieutenant General Nguyen Quyet: "Coordinating the Economy with National Defense Within the 3rd Military Region"]

[Text] In the work of building and defending the socialist fatherland, the 3rd Military Region is both a key agricultural and industrial region of the country and one of the vital strategic regions within the country's national defense system and the people's war to defend the fatherland.

In recent years, under the resolutions of the 4th and 5th National Congresses of Delegates of the Party, the military region, together with the local party committee echelons and governments, has given its attention to building up basic units, upholding the right of collective ownership of the people and strengthening our economic and military potentials with a view toward successfully carrying out the two strategic tasks of the revolution today, tasks that have been concretized within the military region in the "prosperity and victory" movement.

The military region is in complete agreement with the provinces and municipality concerning what the goals of coordinating the economy with the national defense system should be, namely, creating the conditions for both the economy and national defense system to develop, accelerating production and making every effort to strengthen the political base while increasing the strength of the national defense system, increasing the fighting strength of the armed forces, being ready to take the initiative and win victory over the enemy in any war situation, firmly defending each basic unit and locality, contributing to the defense of the entire country and fulfilling our international obligation.

The guideline for coordinating the economy with the national defense system within the various localities of the military region is:

On the basis of thoroughly understanding the military line and task as well as the economic line and strategy of the party, all levels and sectors must adopt planning and plans for coordinating the economy and national defense system that are based on the position, tasks and characteristics of each locality and area and are designed to develop the strengths of each area, locality and

basic unit so that both tasks of building the economy and strengthening the national defense system can be carried out well.

On a nationwide scale as well as within every locality, the strength of the new system, the new economy, the new culture and the new socialist man is the solid foundation of the national defense system. Therefore, the coordination of the economy and national defense must be based on master plans for economic, cultural and social development and the defense plans of the country as a whole, the military region and each province and municipality so that appropriate steps can be taken to insure that both the economy and the national defense system are strong. Because, strong economic units create the conditions necessary for military forces to be strong and strong military forces protect economic forces and help to build the economy and stimulate its development.

In the military region as well as each province and municipality within it, there are many different areas, all of which have the capabilities needed to achieve "prosperity and victory" provided that they know how to properly apply our guideline, how to develop the strengths of each area and mobilize each person, each household, each basic unit and so forth to make good use of labor and arable land and expand the trade sector.

The realities of the 3rd Military Region in recent years show that it is extremely necessary to correctly define the requirements and the quantitative and qualitative demands that the revolution must meet during each period of time in order to adopt accurate planning and plans and establish specific forms of organization and measures that are consistent with the characteristics of each area.

In the coastal area, we have mobilized the entire party and all the people to "achieve prosperity and victory by reclaiming land from the sea." There, militia and self-defense forces and ready reserve forces, both local forces and forces brought in from the rear, have formed the nucleus of efforts to build dikes to reclaim land from the sea, open new land to cultivation, establish new villages, organize combat alert units, build battle fortifications, plant bamboo and rattan along the coast and build roads, thereby coordinating the development of the agro-fishing-salt marsh economy with the expansion of the defense "belt" on the mainland and at sea. For generations, the municipality of Haiphong had only a little more than 50,000 hectares of farmland. In only 10 years, mainly the past several years, through land reclamation projects of suitable size conducted by the village, district and municipal levels, more than 10,000 hectares have been opened, thousands of which are now in use and have turned Dinh Vu Island into a peninsula. In the years ahead, Cat Ba Island will also be turned into a peninsula and Route 5, which runs from the inner city to Cat Ba District, will be lengthened by about 60 kilometers. Recently, Haiphong rebuilt the Cai Trap Canal. The economic changes that have occurred in the coastal areas of Haiphong, Ha Nam Ninh Province and Thai Binh Province have been accompanied by profound social and cultural changes, thereby creating for these areas a new position and new forces.

In the lowlands, mobile militia and self-defense forces and ready reserve forces are being used in campaigns to improve fields, complete farmland water conservancy projects, build roads and bridges, organize labor in manual labor worksites, practice intensive cultivation and multicropping and apply scientific and technical measures in order to constantly raise labor productivity and economic efficiency. At the same time, they are building defense positions, thus making the national defense-security system increasingly solid and strong.

In the mountains, we are developing the large potentials and the strengths of the area that lie in forestry and livestock production. At the same time, we are opening roads, strengthening the socialist production relations and using the terrain to build the economy in coordination with strengthening the national defense-security system.

In the wards and cities of the municipality, we have coordinated the development of industry and the handicraft trades and the providing of jobs to military personnel who return to their units and laborers with building up self-defense forces to serve, along with the People's Public Security Forces, as the nucleus in the maintenance of order and security, in building enterprises and subwards that are solid and strong in every respect and in insuring the proper fulfillment of the functions of the basic units. At the same time, economic mobilization plans have been adopted to shift the municipality from a peace time to a war time footing.

As a result of the initial steps taken to coordinate the economy with national defense in a manner well suited to the specific circumstances of each area, many places have created the conditions needed to "resolve their difficulties on their own," improved their standard of living, carried out economic and social development, developed the national defense and security system and met the requirements of the locality while reinforcing the front on both a routine and emergency basis.

On each level and within each sector, efforts to coordinate the economy and national defense must comply with basic, long-range guidelines; at the same time, sudden changes must be foreseen so that timely adjustments can be made. The purpose of strengthening the national defense system in peace time is to meet the requirements of the country in time of war. Every preparation must be made in an active and urgent manner but not all preparations should be made at once. Certain jobs should be performed first and other jobs should be performed last depending upon the requirements of war, upon capabilities, upon the rate of growth of the national economy and the assistance provided by the fraternal countries. In the immediate future, each annual and long-term socio-economic program must fully reflect the four goals set by the 5th National Party Congress. Therefore, the military region and the provinces and municipality within the 3rd Military Region have reached agreement on the specifics and programs involved in coordinating the economy and national defense on the basis of the following several principles:

--At those key places where the need to maintain combat readiness is high, we must, even though difficulties are still being faced and the costs involved are high, be determined to provide the manpower and money needed, including by

mobilizing manpower and money in the rear for the front, so that all of these places are ready to fight and die for victory.

In the rear, although there are certain national defense jobs that must be performed, because our economic capabilities are still limited, we are conducting pilot projects while adapting planning and plans for rapidly expanding these pilot projects when necessary and when the required conditions exist.

--For those jobs that are necessary and benefit both the economy and national defense, we are determined to assemble the necessary forces and overcome the difficulties being faced in order to successfully perform these jobs and bring about marked changes within each area, within each locality and throughout the military region.

Coordinating the economy and national defense requires planning and plans based on fundamental, long-range guidelines; however, the military region and the various localities have projected the sudden changes that could occur in order to promptly adjust these guidelines.

In the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, even during the very first days of that war, the military region estimated that roughly 1 million cadres and soldiers would have to be sent to reinforce the South. On the basis of that projection, the localities calculated how they should balance their forces in order to fully meet the requirements of supporting the battlefield and implement the slogans "the entire 3rd Military Region supports the frontline," "providing not 1 kilogram of paddy, not one soldier less than needed" while maintaining sufficient production and combat forces within the locality as well as forces to build the country over the long range. Ten ton fields and 5 tons per hectare provinces emerged even during the days of heavy fighting. In the 20 years of the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the provinces and municipality of the military region supported the great frontlines with manpower and materiel basically as planned.

Following the liberation of the South and the reunification of the country, the military region and its provinces and municipality, quick to foresee how the situation would develop and foresee the schemes and tactics of the Beijing expansionists against our country, established the 3rd Military Region as both a rear area and a frontline that must meet the three requirements of being the masters of the locality, helping to be the masters of the entire country and fulfilling our international task. On the basis of this assessment, the localities of the military region made every effort to prepare forces to reinforce the border areas of the fatherland and the various battlefields. In 3 years (1976-1984), the 3rd Military Region has recruited or inducted into the army two-thirds the number of troops that were recruited during the years of the resistance against the United States. Within a short time after the Chinese expansionists attacked the border, the military region had built and strengthened many divisions and regiments and promptly sent them to reinforce the front. Also during this period, the localities of the military region have mobilized hundreds of thousands of persons to provide combat support in the northern border provinces. This is not to mention the hundreds of

thousands of persons that have gone to build new economic zones or participate in the building and defense of the fatherland at places of key economic and national defense significance throughout the country.

The coordination of the economy with national defense must be comprehensive in nature, with efforts focused during each period on matters of key importance in order to be "strong in key areas, solid overall."

The coordination of the economy and national defense is something that must be carried out in a comprehensive and long-range manner; however, during each period, the localities within the military region have, on the basis of the nature of our military region as both a rear area and a frontline, on the basis of the three requirements of being the masters of the locality, helping to be the masters of the entire country and fulfilling our international obligation, on the basis of our combat strategy and the schemes and tactics of the enemy and on the basis of the position and task of the locality, defined certain areas, certain sectors, certain jobs and certain projects as being of key importance and focused their efforts on bringing about a change in the economic, national defense and security situation within these key areas.

In the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, the military region, in concert with the provinces and municipality, defined the key targets of the U.S. specialists within the military region during each period of time and brought together the forces needed to protect these key targets, thereby helping to defeat the war of destruction waged by the U.S. pirates and holding the losses caused by the enemy to the lowest possible level while maintaining and developing production, maintaining communications-transportation and stabilizing the daily lives of the people.

In the present stage of the revolution, the military region has defined the coastal areas, the islands and the industrial zones as the areas of key importance. On the basis of the basic defense plan of each district, ward and city within each province and the municipality, the localities have defined areas and directions that are of key importance from the standpoint of organizing defenses. On this basis, guidelines have been established for coordinating the economy with national defense and vice versa within the master planning of the locality and coordinating labor with agricultural land and industry, the locality with the central level in order to be the masters of both the economy and national defense. Positive steps have been taken to develop those sectors which both occupy an important socio-economic position and are of pressing importance in national defense and war. We have been gradually redistributing production forces and redistributing labor and the population, especially the technical labor forces of each locality, area, sector and basic unit in accordance with peace time national defense requirements and the requirements involved in mobilizing the armed forces, mobilizing the national economy in time of war, thereby developing the economy while creating the position and forces of the people's war, beginning in key areas and directions.

The military region, which was also quick to recognize the ability of the army to participate in the construction of key projects of the state and locality, has always focused its efforts on agricultural production and considered the

district level to be the level of key importance. The military region has organized forces to build the economy in coordination with the national defense system in key areas of the region and participate in the construction of such key projects as the Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Plant, the railroad, the An Tho sluice in Haiphong, the Thong Nhat Pump Station in Tien Hai, etc. The localities of the region have mobilized militia and self-defense forces to participate in hundreds of campaigns to build water conservancy projects and dikes to reclaim land from the sea, thereby beginning to tap the strength of each locality, each sector, each area, each basic unit, each household and each person working together on the two strategic tasks and helping the region to become "strong in key areas, solid overall."

In the present situation, coordinating the economy with national defense, national defense with the economy and building both the economic and national defense potentials of the 3rd Military Region are practical ways to build the battlefield deployment of a people's war to defend the socialist fatherland.

In view of our country's circumstances, namely that we are at peace but must contend with the wide-ranging war of sabotage of the enemy while being ready to deal with the possibility of the enemy launching a large-scale war of aggression and in view of the fact that these two strategic tasks are closely interrelated and we must simultaneously win victory and be ready to win victory over the enemy in every war situation, our efforts to build and strengthen the national defense system must insure that both strategic tasks of our party and people are performed. Building the country in conjunction with defending the country, this is the law of the survival and development of our nation, both in the immediate future and over the long-range.

In recent years, the various party committee echelons have been leading the entire party organization, all the people and the local armed forces in performing the two strategic tasks of the party through the "prosperity and victory" movement, which coordinates the economy with national defense, national defense with the economy, national defense with security. All levels have strong stationary and mobile forces. Every economic unit is also a combat and combat support unit. Every combat unit must be a shock force in economic construction...

The people's committees on the various levels have adopted specific plans and measures dealing with mobilization, organization and guidance to coordinate the economy with national defense. The various strata of the people have been displaying the spirit of collective ownership from the standpoint of politics, the economy and national defense. Each person and each household participates in discussing and actively performing the tasks of building the economy, strengthening the national defense system and fulfilling our international obligation.

Displaying the spirit of collective ownership, each economic, cultural, social and other sector has, through its function, task, strengths and capabilities, closely coordinated with the national defense system, helped to complete military tasks within the locality and, in this way, promoted the strong development of each of their activities.

The mass organizations, such as the Youth Union, the Women's Union and the Trade Union, have educated and mobilized their members to eagerly participate in strengthening the national defense system and building up the armed forces, thereby exercising the right of ownership of the working people in the field of national defense within the locality.

The local military agencies, which have been and are endeavoring to fulfill their function as the staff of the party committee and government in local military work, in the training and commanding of the armed forces in the maintenance of combat readiness and in combat, must have deep knowledge of the socio-economic development policies and plans of the locality so that they can take the initiative and constantly maintain close coordination between military work and the work of each economic, cultural and social sector, thereby achieving the highest possible returns in the building of the national defense system within the locality.

The local people's armed forces, from the main force troops of the military region to the border defense troops, the local troops of the provinces, municipality and districts and the militia and self-defense forces of the basic units, must fulfill their functions and tasks as the central shock forces within the national defense system and people's war and the central shock forces of the revolutionary movements within the locality and at basic units and work along with the people to successfully carry out the two strategic tasks of the revolution.

7809

CSO: 4209/143

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

WAYS TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL DEFENSE IN LOCALITIES PROPOSED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Nov 84 p 2

[Article by Vu Van: "The Strength of National Defense in Localities"]

[Text] The strength of national defense in localities is an intrinsic part of the overall strength of the entire country's national defense. Like the strength of the country's national defense, that of each locality is made up of many factors: the politico-moral situation, economic, scientific and technical potential, military organization and degree of economic-national defense cooperation. These factors will generate a real, great and timely strength to defeat the aggressors and firmly to defend the localities and entire country in wartime. Actual facts about the combat readiness and performance of localities on the northern border of our country--especially Ha Tuyen, Cao Bang, Lang Son and Quang Ninh Provinces--in April and May this year when they resisted the aggression and campaign launched by the Chinese expansionists have demonstrated the need and possibility for each locality to make preparations and to build up and strengthen their national defense capacities even in peacetime. When put to the test, this strength must and can be reinforced and developed to quickly meet the requirements of the situation and tasks during any given period of time.

The politico-moral factor is one which plays a decisive role in the national defense strength of each locality. A primary, important element of this factor is the need to build and consolidate a political and moral unanimity among party members, cadres, tribal people and local armed forces for the task of building the economy, strengthening national defense and standing ready to fight and to support the front line in order to carry out most satisfactorily the lines and strategic missions of the entire party, people and army in each locality. To materialize the "response from tens of thousands of people to each order issued" slogan, to bring all potential into play, to overcome all difficulties and to accomplish all missions well, it is necessary to educate each local citizen and soldier to enable them to see clearly the enemy together with his cunning schemes and his weak and strong points; to raise their revolutionary vigilance, patriotism, love for socialism, self-sufficient spirit, initiative, creativeness, solidarity and cooperation; and to induce them to develop their good tribal and local traditions in carrying out all activities in their capacity as masters of their localities in all situations and under all circumstances.

A strong economy is a stable source of the material bases needed to build a strong national defense. In building the economy, each locality must strive to implement strictly and creatively the socialist revolutionary lines, the socialist economic construction lines and four general socioeconomic targets for the 1980's as set forth by the Fifth Party Congress. In the agricultural forefront in 1983, the per-hectare paddy output was 5 tons in as many as 20 provinces and cities, 7 tons in more than 50 districts, from 8 to 10 tons and even more in over 500 cooperatives and production collectives and between 14 and 15 tons in dozens of other cooperatives. The actual production situation has demonstrated that by redistributing the labor force among various regions, by transferring many more laborers to vast and thinly populated lands to exploit them and by improving production organization and economic management, even the provinces and districts in the northern mountain region, in the Central Highlands and in eastern and southwestern Nam Bo will be able to develop the local economy and simultaneously to coordinate it with rear service activities to create the material sources necessary for combat purposes.

Naturally, local socioeconomic development involves the development of industry, communications, information, posts and telegraph, public health, education and culture in each locality so as to bring its own strength into play. Each province and city possesses also a relatively large scientific-technical force including scientific-technical cadres, technical workers in various sectors and trades, scientific-technical research organs, colleges, vocational middle schools, technical workers' training schools, and so forth. Once developed, this force's capacities will not only help develop the local economy but also contribute positively to consolidating local national defense and building socialism throughout the country.

Under the unified leadership of the central level, each locality must coordinate economic construction with national defense strengthening according to a long-term basic plan and by stable stages. This coordination must be effected in the course of both perennial and yearly plans and also in the actual process of organizing farming and water conservancy, building communication lines, opening new lands, afforesting, building sea dikes, standing on combat alert, patrolling, and so on. The practical experiences gathered recently from the northern border provinces and districts such as Ha Tuyen and Yen Minh have shown that once we have taken the initiative and have a sound plan and good organization, we will be able--when the enemy starts shelling and launches encroachments--to quickly counterattack and destroy him, to limit casualties, to protect the people's life and property, to defend the locality and, afterward, immediately to resume production and to carry out cultivation and harvesting with success, thus fulfilling the local production plan. It is both necessary and possible for each locality--especially if situated in the order or coastal area or on a sea island--to combine national defense closely with security maintenance in order to ensure political security and social order and security, foil the enemy's manifold war of destruction and stand ready to cope with the situation whenever the enemy launches a large-scale war of aggression against any locality and the entire country. By skillfully positioning and

fully using the capacities of production installations and infrastructural networks which promote production and life, it is possible to provide an on-the-spot rear service and material-technical facilities for the main force corps [binh doan] to carry out mobile combat activities in localities.

To build a strong local military organization is to develop a factor having a direct and decisive effect on the national defense strength of each locality. It is necessary to build local troops, militia, self-defense and reserve forces and local military units and organs, to improve the military knowledge and combat readiness of the local people and to raise the fighting standard of the local troops and militia and self-defense forces as well as the level at which they can coordinate with the main force corps to annihilate the enemy and defend their localities. The local armed forces in the border and coastal areas and on islands must act as a backbone to enable the local people to defeat the enemy's military encroachments, to carry out on-the-spot defense and to fight to defend their localities whenever the enemy launches a large-scale war of destruction.

The local troops of provinces (or cities) and districts (or precincts) must be organized neatly and strongly, thoroughly understand the need to master the local situation and launch a local offensive, know the local terrain very well, be able to conduct joint operations with the militia and self-defense forces and to coordinate with the main force in all types of campaigns, and develop their own role as a local mobile force and a backbone in a local people's war. The militia and self-defense forces of localities and production installations must be organized according to the population rate and on a scale and with a combat training and preparedness appropriate to the task, terrain, capabilities and battle position of each province and district situated in the mountainous region, midlands, delta and coastal and urban areas. The militia and self-defense force must necessarily be associated with the production task in order to be able to carry out protracted and effective activities and must be conversant with on-the-spot combat activities especially in strategic regions such as the northern border areas, coastal areas, cities, industrial zones and important base areas during the resistance against the enemy's manifold war of destruction.

The experiences of Military Regions 1 and 2 and of Ha Tuyen and Yen Minh last April, May and June have demonstrated the need and possibility for the local and armed forces in the border areas and on islands to fight according to the plan and battle position of the entire line and region, to cling firmly to their own position, to counterattack quickly and launch the offensive resolutely. They must and can fight the enemy right on the battlefield and in all areas; they must and can fight by using modern rifles and artillery as well as locally manufactured weapons; they must and can fight at any given point and on a large area, display high mobility and fulfill their mission as planned. The local armed forces--especially militia and self-defense personnel--are permanently attached to local production installations, fully accustomed to the local terrain and weather conditions and thoroughly aware of the overall local situation. To bring their strength into play, it is inadvisable to use the local armed forces--especially the militia and self-defense personnel--like the main force or to have them replace it and assume its function; instead, they must be conversant with the fighting method suitable for a local people's war.

While organizing the militia and self-defense forces, each locality must rationally arrange the registration, organization, management, training and quick mobilization of reservists whenever the mobilization order is issued, and must also prepare to execute the yearly youth induction plan satisfactorily. Certain localities in the border, coastal, airfield and harbor areas have border defense troops. The sound and effective education, training and use of this armed force and the development of its role also constitute a major factor in making military organizations more effective, in defending the border well and in increasing the national defense strength in each locality.

Combat realities in the northern border provinces and districts have also confirmed the victorious lesson that each of these localities had a defense plan and was imbued with the strategic offensive spirit, that it mastered the situation to annihilate the enemy and annihilated him to master the situation, that it used its own aggregate strength to destroy the enemy, to defend both the locality and country and effectively to support the forefront, and that it kept up the initiative to cope with all situations in the war to defend the fatherland. This plan covered the building and deployment of armed forces, the building of a battle position where it was possible to take the initiative and simultaneous to promote national defense and security maintenance, the building of an on-the-spot reserve, the shift from local peacetime to wartime activities, the simultaneous performance of combat and production, and the coordination with other localities and with the corps, services and branches which performed mobile combat activities in these localities.

The strength of national defense in localities must be manifest in provinces, cities, districts, precincts and production installations. Today each province has a fairly large land base, a relatively dense population and its own economic, scientific and technical potential and strong position. There is a major and realistic need to build each province into a strategic unit of national defense and for the war to defend the fatherland--a unit capable of fighting the enemy, defending itself, creating conditions for the main force to concentrate on important areas and, at the same time, contributing to the common fight carried on by both the military region and entire country. Of course, within the entire scope of each province (or city), it is necessary to build district (or precinct) military fortresses and to develop village and ward production installations, factories, state farms and so forth into combat units to simultaneously produce and fight during the war to defend the fatherland. Building installations that are stable and strong from all points of view has become a key requirement in building stable and powerful districts and provinces. However, the strength of national defense in localities lies not only in their own overall potential but depends also on whether it can receive and combine with the economic, military, scientific and technical strength of the central and high levels, whether the on-the-spot forces are coordinated with the mobile ones and whether the combat activities of local armed forces are correlated with those of the main force corps stationed in localities and are linked to the battle positions of the neighboring localities. Under

the unified leadership of the central level, it is, therefore, necessary to increase the effectiveness of the local party organizations' leadership for the strengthening of national defense, to develop the sense of responsibility of the local administration and local economic, cultural and social sectors, to emphasize the role of local mass organizations and all local people as collective owners and to use local military organs as capable staffs in building up the potentials for and creating a stable strength of national defense in localities.

9332

CSO: 4209/160

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

WAYS TO IMPROVE TEACHING OF TRADITION

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Nov 84 pp 55-61

[Article by Senior Colonel Do Cong Cuong: "Some Experiences in Teaching, Cultivating and Displaying the Working Class Character and Army Traditions Among Special Operations Troops"]

[Text] Its working class character and fine traditions are invaluable assets and two of the basic factors of the invincible fighting strength of our army. They give cadres and soldiers added strength and inspire them to meet each challenge and overcome each difficulty in the bitter struggle to firmly defend the fatherland and successfully build socialism. During the past several years of the major campaign now under way within the army, because it realizes the tremendous importance of teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and traditions of the army, the Special Operations Branch has always considered this to be a vital element of its party work-political work. Facts have shown that teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and traditions of the army within the Special Operations Branch in a way that yields practical results are not a simply matter. They demand, above everything else, that the commanders and political cadres on the various echelons not only realize what their full responsibility is but also that they bring about a change in their attitude and actions so that the efforts to teach, cultivate and display the working class character and traditions of the army are productive, not superficial or perfunctory. From a review of what this branch has done, a number of experiences can be drawn.

To begin with, it is necessary to instill in cadres and soldiers a new outlook toward studying, cultivating and displaying the working class character and traditions of the army.

The purpose of studying the working class character and the traditions of the army are to cultivate and display this character and these traditions. However, due to the failure to adhere to this guideline, there was a period of time during which the study of the working class character and the traditions of the army within some units of the branch lacked a clearly defined objective and was carried out in a superficial, form for form's sake manner, as a result of which it had little practical effect. At some places, the study of this character and these traditions, either consciously or unconsciously, involved nothing more than presenting fine expressions and bright examples of this

character and these traditions and feats of arms recorded by the entire army and the branch. However, because this effort stopped there, the majority of veteran cadres felt that it was simply a "review of things already studied." Young cadres and the mass of soldiers, although they were given increased pride in the army, in the branch, due to the failure to guide their thinking and actions, were not provided with guidelines on the basis of which they could determine what they had to do to cultivate and display this fine character and these traditions in their daily actions.

As a result of recognizing and promptly correcting this shortcoming, changes for the better occurred in the study, cultivation and display of the working class character and the traditions of the army within the Special Operations Branch. Superficial and shallow forms of study were replaced by methods of study that are practical in content. This came about as a result of a change of viewpoint and perspective in studying, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army. Now, this study is not merely oriented toward praising things of the past, more importantly, it is designed to learn from these expressions of this character and these traditions how one must think and act in order to display this character and these traditions and complete the specific, daily task of each unit and person in the best possible manner so that this character and these traditions are firmly maintained, are carried on, are enhanced.

Having grasped the purpose of studying, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army, many units of the branch now display a greater consciousness of ideology, increased militancy and greater practicality in guiding and conducting the study of this character and these traditions.

Achieving, through study, a uniform understanding throughout the army of the specifics involved in the working class character and the traditions of the army is an indispensable requirement. However, if all of these specifics are dealt with in deep detail at the same time, the focus of study is easily lost and it becomes impossible to effectively guide thinking and actions.

Experience has shown that in order for this study to be both practical and productive, the commander and the political agency must keep abreast of and closely guide the efforts of each unit in this area.

Although the political task of the special operations troops is the same for all units within the branch, each basic unit has a different specific task and exhibits different strengths and weaknesses from the standpoint of the working class character and the traditions of the army. Some units are directly engaged in combat tasks; some units are engaged in training and maintaining combat readiness; other units are performing an international task in a friendly country... Some units have a tradition of fighting very bravely but are displaying certain weaknesses in the area of internal unity. Some units are poorly disciplined and experiencing problems in their relations with civilians. Other units tend to be satisfied with their achievements and have little desire to study, to improve their proficiency in the tactics and technology of their branch in a people's war to defend the fatherland.

With a view toward teaching and displaying the working class character and traditions of the army in a more practical way, the branch, on the basis of the specific political task and situation of each unit, has directed the efforts of its units toward studying a few traditions in detail. This study must be coordinated with the unit's actual situation, such as the strengths that must be developed upon and the weaknesses that must be corrected, must build pride and a sense of responsibility and be governed by a specific plan of action for the entire unit and for each cadre and soldier.

In this way, studying, cultivating and displaying the working class character and traditions of the army, instead of being boring, become much more vital and useful efforts. The key here is knowing what to draw from the bright examples that have been set and what to study, knowing what must be done to closely tie this study to the realities of the task of the unit, of each person and not fall into the practice of talking on and on about achievements and accomplishments.

Secondly, the teaching of the traditions of the branch must be closely tied to the teaching of the common traditions of the entire army and the effort to cultivate and display the working class character and traditions of the army must be based on the new requirements involved in the buildup and combat operations of the branch in the current stage of the revolution.

The working class character of our army never changes; however, it is always developing along with the development of the tasks of the revolution, the tasks of the army and branch.

The fine traditions of the army, in general, and the branch, in particular, are also continuously developing. The traditions of the army are manifested in the traditions of each military corps, each service and each branch. As each military corps, service and branch develops its own traditions, it enhances and enriches the traditions of the entire army.

On 19 March 1967, the special operations troops had the honor of being paid a visit by Uncle Ho. He said: "Special operations is special work, is a special honor and requires special effort." He pointed out the following to special operations cadres and soldiers:

"As regards tactics, you must be especially flexible.

Technically, you must be especially well trained and proficient.

Your political stand must be especially solid and firm.

Your discipline must be especially strict.

Your determination to win victory over the enemy, your determination to wipe out the enemy must be especially high.

You must be especially loyal to the party.

You must be especially loving toward the people.

You must be especially patient when engaged in civilian proselyting.

Your internal unity must be especially strong.

When coordinating with other branches, you must work with them especially closely.

You must complete and complete well each and every task you are assigned.

You must surmount, must successfully overcome every special difficulty you encounter..."

We have made these words of advice spoken by Uncle Ho the foundation and guidelines for building the character and traditions of the branch. In the 17 years that they have been faithful to the teachings of Uncle Ho in their struggle, the troops of the Special Operations Branch have completed each task assigned to them well. To date, 78 units and 141 cadres and soldiers of the branch have been commended as a Heroic Unit or Hero of the people's armed forces. In the course of their victories and growth, cadre after cadres, soldier after soldier have enhanced the tradition:

"Especially well trained
Bravest of all
Resourceful and bold
Daring attacks and large victories."

This is the tradition of our branch; at the same time, it is a vivid expression of the overall tradition of the entire army. We must study and display the working class character and traditions of the branch so that they are firmly maintained and developed in a manner consistent with the new situation and tasks of our country's revolution, with the combat task of the branch in the people's war to defend the fatherland, with the new circumstances and requirements involved in the buildup of the Special Operations Branch in the course of our army's development toward an increasingly regular and modern army.

At the heart of this matter is the need to research in detail and creatively apply those traditions that typify the branch in the new circumstances and conditions that exist instead of being satisfied with what has been achieved and going no further. As we know, the working class character and glorious traditions of the army are expressed not only in the fields of politics and morale, but also in all areas of organization, fighting methods, personal qualities, the behavior of military personnel and so forth. In this stage of building and defending the fatherland, new developments have occurred in the task, organization, methods of fighting and technical equipment base of the Special Operations Branch. Cultivating and displaying the traditions of the special operations troops mean applying the tradition "especially well trained, bravest of all, resourceful and bold, daring attacks and large victories" in light of these new developments. At the same time, we must cast aside without any pangs of nostalgia those habits and traditions which, although fine, are suited only to the circumstances under which we used to fight.

In the people's war to defend the fatherland, the special operations troops have, in terms of the size of their forces, developed from fighting as small teams, as individual probes and individual units into fighting as joint detachments, as units and joint units. The targets of their attacks have developed from wiping out thugs and members of the puppet administration on the village level, from destroying police stations and subsector offices to destroying enemy nerve centers, wiping out important enemy forces and destroying enemy communications and transportation facilities, enemy means of war and war supplies, thereby helping the other services and branches annihilate whole contingents of enemy forces and win victories of strategic significance on important fronts. The range of their operations has gradually grown from attacks on targets near bases of ours to attacks on command posts, airfields, sea ports, warehouses and important agencies deep within the enemy's rear area. The length of time they have been able to sustain themselves in combat has increased from but a few days to many days. They have developed from attacking and withdrawing swiftly to attacking, taking occupation of, controlling and holding positions and bases for a specific amount of time. They have developed from fighting independently, mainly in assaults, to closely coordinating assaults with their own firepower; from fighting independently to coordinating with the infantry, artillery and many other branches and services; from coordination based on a plan devised before going into combat to directly coordinating with the military corps, branches and services within the formation of forces in a battle, a campaign...

The experience of the special operations troops shows that only by delving deeply into the various aspects of this matter in the light of the new requirements and developments of the branch is it possible to establish specific requirements, guidelines and standards for cultivating and displaying traditions, requirements, guidelines and standards that are thorough and practical and which, therefore, have the effect of guiding the thinking and actions of everyone. This is not merely the work of the political cadre or political agency, it is also the responsibility of the commander and the cadres of the agencies and sectors of the branch.

Therefore, we must know how to tap the combined strength of all organizations and forces, how to utilize each form of activity and measure in order to do a good job of teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army.

This is also an experience that has been drawn from the day to day work of leadership and command within the Special Operations Branch.

Teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army are the combined results of many different areas of work, of efforts by many forces, of ideological work and organizational work... Therefore, to achieve good results, we must firmly adhere to the view of combining our forces and employ the combined strength of each unit as well as the entire branch.

Most importantly, the work of teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army cannot be considered independent, separate work but must be tied to the completion of the unit's

political task, with the results achieved through the performance of this political task being the standard by which the effectiveness of the teaching and cultivation of this character and these traditions is measured. On the other hand, we must also closely coordinate the teaching, cultivation and display of this character and these traditions with the campaigns and movements under way within the unit, such as the determined to win emulation movement to carry out the Major Campaign, the review of efforts to build the basic organizations of the party in combat units, the "entire army acts in accordance with orders" movement, the campaigns to observe the rules and regulations on management, the storage of weapons and technical equipment... The realities of the Special Operations Branch have shown that every movement and campaign plays a definite role in creating the conditions for spurring the unit on toward the completion of its task and contributes to teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army. Conversely, it is only through such movements and campaigns that the efforts to teach, cultivate and display this character and these traditions can be comprehensive and dynamic and yield practical results.

The experience of the Special Operations Branch has shown that special importance must be attached to fully maintaining the campaign to "display the fine character and increase the fighting strength of the people's armed forces" and to building basic organizations of the party that are truly pure, solid and strong to serve as the nucleus in the building of basic units that are strong and solid in every respect. Group A.382 has been continuously fighting in a friendly country under extremely difficult circumstances. However, because it has made the Major Campaign the target of its efforts and actions and has constantly concerned itself with building basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong, the group is not only a unit that always excellently completes its task, but is also a unit that has recorded many good results in cultivating and displaying the working class character and traditions of the branch.

Firmly adhering to the view of taking a combined approach in teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army also means closely coordinating the unit with the rear area. Our army is a people's army. The people not only contribute manpower and wholeheartedly support and care for troops, but also play the role of a very important teacher of troops. For this reason, in the guidance it provides, the Special Operations Branch considers utilizing this factor of education to be a very basic requirement in teaching, cultivating and displaying this character and these traditions.

The people are a very large entity. However, to the individual unit, the people are the people, the people's government and the people's mass organizations within the area in which its troops are stationed and at those places at which the unit conducts its activities. Maintaining "fish and water," a fraternal relationship with the local people, government and mass organizations is one way to express the fine character and traditions of our army. At the same time, we must make very effective use of the educational role played by the people, government and mass organizations within the locality in motivating, teaching and training troops. The experience of many units within the Special Operations Branch shows that it is not from the

measures which are taken that difficulties arise. Of decisive significance is that once something is correctly realized and the problem has been correctly raised, the cadres and soldiers of each unit as well as the local people, government and mass organizations will develop more than a few ways to strengthen their relationship and utilize the role played by the people in motivating and teaching troops.

The people are also the family, the parents, the wives and children, the brothers and sisters of cadres and soldiers and the government and mass organizations in the rear. The political attitudes of these persons have a very strong impact upon the politics and morale of each person within each unit. The role that they play is a concrete expression of the role that the rear area plays for the frontlines. Making use of this positive role in teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army is indispensable and is also part of the experience of the Special Operations Branch in its application of the view of taking a combined approach toward this matter.

Firmly adhering to the view of taking a combined approach also requires making full use of the various forces within the unit, such as the force of cadres (command cadres, political cadres and the other types of cadres), the force of party members and Youth Union members and the large corps of soldiers.

However, among these forces, the experience of the Special Operations Branch has shown that it is necessary to recognize the differences that exist between the small minority, cadres who have been in the army for many years and the very large majority, cadres and soldiers who are still youths. While we must know how to coordinate many different measures and forms of activity, it is important that these forms and measures be well suited to each category of persons and not be general in nature. The majority of middle and high ranking cadres are persons who have directly contributed to building the traditions of the branch. They now hold key leadership and command positions within the various units. The brighter the example set by these comrades is, the greater of an effect they have in teaching, cultivating and displaying the working class character and the traditions of the army. The important question in leadership work is how to perform good ideological work, how to perform this work in ways that gain the participation of these comrades in teaching, cultivating and displaying this character and these traditions. Experience has shown that the "meetings with heroes," "meetings with soldiers who fought at Dien Bien Phu," "meetings with soldiers who fought in the offensive and uprisings in the spring of 1968" and so forth of our branch, which are practical in content and highly ideological and educational in nature, have yielded good results.

The young officers and soldiers of the branch, although they have not been in the army for very long, have made certain contributions to upholding the branch's traditions in the fight to defend the fatherland on the southwestern border and on the northern border against the lackey Pol Pot clique and the Chinese aggressor army. They are the generation who will carry on and develop the traditions of the branch and, as such, are a category of no less importance. The branch has held "conferences of young officers," "conferences of outstanding soldiers" and so forth in order to provide cadres and soldiers

with an opportunity to study and exchange experiences. The basic units frequently make arrangements for the Youth Union to hold forums, present examples of good persons and good work within the unit, conduct competitions on knowledge of the army, visit museums and invite veteran revolutionary cadres of the party, the army and the locality to speak. These forms of activity and measures are suited to youths. Of these activities, youths like the "youth discussions" the best. Because, at these "discussions," vivid stories about the bravery, the readiness to die for the cause of the revolution and the comradeship and fellowship of the cadres and soldiers of the unit are the main topic of discussion and from them are drawn fine aspects of the branch's tradition.

The major holidays we celebrate provide a very good opportunity to teach class character, revolutionary tradition and tradition in combat. However, it is still necessary to have themes and forms of activity that are suited to each category of persons so that the celebration of holidays has a practical educational impact. At the same time, we must have detailed action guidelines in order to promote the successful completion of the present very large tasks of the branch.

7809

CSO: 4209/145

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

LOCALITIES' MARKET MANAGEMENT EFFORTS SEEM IMPROVED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Dec 84 p 1

[Article: "Many Localities Strengthen Market Management: Procurement of Farm Products and Food Goods"]

[Text] Along with stepping up crop growing, livestock raising, and the production of consumer goods, many localities have undertaken additional measures to strengthen market management and obtain additional merchandise for the state. Committees for guiding market reform and management in many places have gone directly to precincts and districts, and a number of villages and wards to help production installations promptly make a number of obligations in realization, organization, structure, etc. Virtually all the provinces, cities, precincts, and districts have formed market management units, the core of which are commercial cadres with the active, real participation of the public security sector. On many fields and in many sectors, state commerce and marketing cooperatives are surging forward fairly vigorously in business, obtaining sources of goods, expanding retail sales, beginning to successfully employ the two-price structure and two modes of business, and rising up to take over the market, maintain price stability, and even better support production and daily life.

So far, the Quang Ninh Province commercial sector has procured vegetables, pork, soybeans, and peanuts nearly approximating the year's plan, an increase of from 3 to 5 percent compared with 1983's level of implementation. For buffaloes and beef cattle, the northern provinces have, over the past 11 months, bought more than 5,000 tons, meeting more than 71 percent of the yearly plan norm, a 13.4 percent increase compared with the corresponding period last year. Included herein, the commerce of Nghe Tinh and Quang Lien Son Provinces and Hanoi Municipality has bought 15 to 113 percent in excess of the annual plan norm. Nghe Tinh commerce is the unit buying the highest volume of production -- more than 1,700 tons. The Nghe Binh commercial sector, coordinating closely among the district commercial corporations in the province, has procured more than 17,000 tons of sugar. Fifteen of the province's districts and cities have bought 50 or in excess of assigned norms.

Dong Ha City (Nha Tri Thien), thanks to rearranging the number of private commercial households selling rice, is strengthening inspection and control in strict accordance with laws and policies stipulated by the state and beginning to better manage the grain market. Since the beginning of the year the Dong Ha market

management unit discovered 1,207 instances of the illegal sale of goods the state manages, collecting in value more than 100,000 dong. In Ho Chi Minh City, the management board of the marketing cooperative and the municipal youth union are coordinating to build more than 200 stands to sell vegetables and fruit managed by youth union members in 92 wards in the city. To contribute to the struggle to stabilize prices, youth union members in these stands have undertaken the task to create sources of vegetables by means of stressing the purchase of goods from the city vegetable and fruit corporation and precinct commerce, procurement in the suburbs through economic associations, and obtainment of sources of goods in bridgehead markets.

Many localities also are in the process of redelineating markets, rearranging the network of markets, reorganizing private merchants in accordance with each sector in the markets in order to better manage the marketplace.

6915

CSO: 4209/138

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

HA BAC TAKES STEPS TO CONTROL CIGARETTE MARKET

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Dec 84, p 2

[Article by Xuan Cuong: "Ha Bac Manages the Cigarette Market"]

[Text] Ha Bac, aside from the Ha Bac Cigarette Factory (subordinate to the Federation of Cigarette Enterprises, Ministry of Food Industry), each year produces approximately 95 to 100 million packs of cigarettes. There also are from 40 to 45 million packs of various types produced by private individuals, most concentrated in the two cites of Bac Ninh and Bac Giang and in Dinh Bang Village of Tien Son District.

According to incomplete data obtained, within the province there are between 1,400 and 1,500 households rolling cigarettes for hire, or both rolling and selling cigarettes, each year consuming from 900 to 1,000 tons of raw materials for cigarettes equal to 40 percent of the raw materials provided the Ha Bac Cigarette Factory. This does not include the addition recently of a cigarette processing station subordinate to the Level 2 Arts and Crafts Corporation which each year produces approximately 400,000 to 500,000 packs (the primary raw materials are from procurement or from confiscation from people selling cigarettes illegally) and a production team belonging to Dap Cau Ward (Bac Ninh City) which each year produces approximately 240,000 to 250,000 packs (the primary raw materials come from fully using the tobacco waste and refuse of the cigarette factory mixed with some additional tobacco purchased separately).

The Ha Bac Cigarette Factory's product (including the pack and the tobacco) is managed by the state and distributed according to an overall plan. That managed by the cigarette processing station subordinate to the Level 2 Arts and Crafts Corporation is for balancing local needs and the remainder for private business operations. Dinh Bang is a production site carrying on a hearty business in cigarettes. Here, virtually all the families more or less are involved in the cigarette business. Of the almost 1,700 households in the village, some 788 either roll the cigarettes for sale or do it for other households. One hundred twenty households have been put in the large calibre business category, including 60 that specialize in making cigarettes packaged in counterfeit packs, 43 that specialize in looking for raw materials, and 17 that look for paper, stamps, labels, and so on. Some 17 households are listed in the "big" calibre yet the surrounding people call them cigarette "companies," one of which holds the business monopoly in a region (outside the province). A number of "companies" hire five to

seven people to work at their homes. Other "companies" hire people to do the contract ordering of goods, to gather the goods together, and to ship and receive goods to and from the outside, the inside of the house only being the place for negotiating and receiving money. Most of the hired cigarette rolling forces here are general school students and even female instructors and a number of cadres and workers working after hours. If one figures that each household rolls 2 kilograms in all each day, each year Dinh Bang alone has to use from 500 to 600 tons of tobacco, which corresponds to 20 to 25 million packs of cigarettes. This raises a question in Dinh Bang: with so many cigarettes, where are the raw materials and supplies obtained?

According to the Ha Bac Finance Service there are approximately 300 to 400 tons of raw tobacco grown by the people on 5 percent of the land; the remaining 600 to 700 tons come from competing for purchase with the state inside and outside of areas designated for growing tobacco and brought in from other provinces, mostly from Lang Son. The tobacco purchasing plan assigned by the state to Ha Bac for 1984 is 2,700 tons, but by the end of October the procurement stations of the Federation of Cigarette Enterprises 1 had bought only 2,163 tons (if 505 tons bought outside the area are not counted, then only 1,638 tons). This does not take into account the harmful effect of illegal producers who intentionally raise prices in order to buy good tobacco, the state having to buy the bad tobacco. According to stipulations, the amount of raw materials the state buys annually from level 1 to level 4 in quality must be 60 percent, but it is only 23 percent; from level 5 to level 7, 40 percent is stipulated, but again the state must buy up to 77 percent. So, nearly two-thirds of the good tobacco raw materials leaks outside. Why so? On the one hand, it is due to a number of tobacco growers seeking immediate profits without satisfying the obligation to deliver products as contracted with the state. On the other hand, it is due to organizing procurements which are untimely and inconvenient for the seller, the legitimate needs of the farmer not being fully met, procurement prices being unsuitable, the disparity between the state and the outside in the average procurement of a kilogram of raw tobacco sometimes being two or three times, and so on. As for other types of supplies such as essences, paper, labels, stamps, etc., as many of the comrades in the province's market reform and management committee state, "They -- the people who make cigarettes illegally -- have taken advantage of big loopholes in enterprise management, economic management, and cadre management. Of note is that the Vinh Phu Label Printing Factory and the Ha Bac Cigarette Factory have let supplies, stamps and labels leak outside."

Making unauthorized cigarettes in Ha Bac has become a big source of profits for people making a living illegally and has caused considerable difficulties and obstacles for the state in market management in general and cigarette management in particular.

For more than a year now the Ha Bac Provincial Party Committee and People's Committee have devoted considerable time to studying this problem. On 5 October of this year the provincial people's committee issued decision no 492 on unifying management of the cigarette business throughout the entire province.

Dinh Bang, the large business site, is called the province's "gathering point" for making unauthorized cigarettes and it should be dealt with resolutely. There usually were differing views during discussions. Initially, some people felt

that cigarette management was difficult in general, and even more so for Dinh Bang. The majority held that Dinh Bang has revolutionary traditions and a party organization with 257 party members, the center of leadership being a newly-strengthened party committee. This was the framework for changing the situation.

So believing, the province clearly established responsibilities for the party organization and administration: groups together with the Dinh Bang people must, in a short period of time, switch from a village getting rich from the cigarette business to one growing a number of crops, raising a number of animals, and developing a number of other trades to support consumer needs and export. Through the process of decisive struggle between two ways of making a living from within the party to the masses, Dinh Bang has undergone many changes. The people's council and cooperative members congress met and decided: gradually reorganize and rearrange production, redeploy the labor force... to create new changes consistent with the resolution of the party central committee's 6th plenum. This winter Dinh Bang is attempting to grow a number of export crops such as garlic, rehmannia lutea, carrots, and potatoes; this coming spring it will plant more adjoining land.

In trades, there are plans to assign approximately 200 laborers (primarily students who have quit school) to making wool carpets for export and 50 laborers to work in the polished lacquer and bamboo shade trade in existing installations, organize the peeling of lotus seeds and export peanuts for foreign trade, and so on.

Visiting Dinh Bang on this occasion one clearly sees that no longer are "home after home, people after people" rolling cigarettes and talking about cigarettes. Arriving at the market and going deeply into the "six city gates" of Dinh Bang, one also no longer sees the sale of raw materials and supplies for making cigarettes as before. All types of large and small vehicles coming to pick up goods also have dwindled completely. However, there still are a number of people who regret losing the large source of income and are seeking ways to do business secretly. A number of "companies" have sought ways to restore connections or have moved to other places to make a living; a number of large business households refuse to declare or inadequately declare raw materials, supplies, and production tools after having the decision of the provincial people's committee on cigarette management. An inspection drive in a few villages near Dinh Bang during October confiscated a number of unauthorized Song Cau cigarettes and hundreds of kilograms of tobacco, cigarette paper, rolling tables, etc.

Ha Bac Province is vigorously, uniformly and resolutely extending management of the cigarette market and striving in a short period of time to restore order in this field of business endeavor. At the same time, with a view to satisfying the consumer needs of local people and travelers, the state commercial sector and marketing cooperative are expanding the cigarette sales network in city, town and village stores, devoting attention to having cigarettes for sale in railroad stations, bus depots, docks, wharfs and stadiums, and arranging for a number of households to serve as retail sales agents in accordance with stipulations.

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

QUALITY, LOCATION OF IRON ORE DEPOSITS OUTLINED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Dec 84 p 3

[Article by Hoang Linh: "Iron Ore"]

[Text] Iron and steel are among the most important types of metals. They are necessary in every field of industry, everyday life and national defense. Iron and steel output per capita is one of the principal measurements of the level of economic development of a country.

The importance of iron and steel can be seen in everything from needles, pen points and knives to machinery, pontoon bridges, workshops, space ships, etc. Iron is generally used in the form of an alloy called steel, not as pure iron. At present, many special types of steel are being manufactured: chromium steel, nickel steel, tungsten steel, molybdenum steel, vanadium steel, cobalt steel, silicon steel, aluminum and titanium steel. One ton of special steel can be used in place of 3 to 5 tons of ordinary steel.

To produce iron or steel for use, it must be refined from iron ore. Iron ore is generally found as brown iron oxide or limonite, red iron oxide or hematite and magnetic iron ore or magnetite.

In our country, according to the legend of Thanh Giong, our forefathers learned to use iron in the era of the Hung Kings. Many places that have iron ore deposits have been found and named, such as Mo Sat in Cao Bang and Lang Lech (Iron Village) in Yen Bai. In ancient times, there were forges at Mo Sat producing cast iron pans and plowshares. The ore is magnetite in the shape of 12-sided crystals about as long as a finger.

The iron ore in Thai Nguyen, which is mainly limonite and magnetite, is extracted at the Linh Nhan, Trai Cau and Tien Bo Mines. Ore reserves there are not large, only enough to supply iron ore to the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex during the initial period of its operation.

A second iron mine with larger reserves is the Quy Xa Mine which lies on the right bank of the Red River. The ore there is brown iron ore.

The Tong Ba Mine in Ha Giang Province has veins of magnetite and hematite that are as much as 3 to 4 meters thick, which lie among layers of igneous rock of the Devonian period half way up high mountains.

The Na Rua Iron Mine in Cao Bang Province does not have large reserves but the quality of the ore there is high.

The iron mines in Cao Lang and Thanh Hoa are small in size but have rather high grade magnetite ore. In Binh Tri Thien, there is the Lang Co Iron Mine. It is rather rich in ore but its reserves have yet to be determined. At Ba Ta and Mo Duc in Nghia Binh Province, there are hematite mines.

In particular, by means of modern geophysical methods, geologists discovered an iron deposit beneath the coastal beach in Thach Ha District in Nghe Tinh Province. This deposit, the Thach Khe Iron Mine, is now the largest mine in our country. Geologists call the Thach Khe Iron Mine a huge "iron ball" hidden deep beneath the white sand. The iron content of the ore there is, at some places, as high as 60 percent or more. Its reserves and quality have been certified and the state is now preparing a plan to mine and refine the ore on a large scale. The Thach Khe Iron Mine is a centralized mine with convenient water and land transportation routes.

The network of iron mines that have been discovered and the indications of iron deposits yet to be discovered will permit our country to establish a developed metal refining industry.

7809

CSO: 4209/143

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Ngô Tiên Ban [NGOO TIEENS BAN], *Lieutenant Colonel

An officer of the Tay Nguyen Corps; recently he participated in a short story contest. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN O 94 p 144)

Trần Thanh Bình [TRAANF THANH BINHF], Professor

*Head of the College of Forestry, Ministry of Forestry; his article covering 20 years of activity at his school appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Nov 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Chuông [NGUYEENX CHUOONG], *Colonel

*Deputy Commander of the 29th Corps; recently he participated in an Armed Forces short story contest. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 138)

Đặng Thế Chương [DAWNGJ THEES CHUWOWNG], *Colonel

His article on the role of the party in the Armed Forces appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 84 p 24)

Đỗ Công Cường [DOOX COONG CUWOWNG], *Colonel

His article on special operations training appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 84 p 55)

Hoàng Kim Dính [HOANGF KIM ZINHS]

*Vice Minister of Engineering and Metals; on 27-28 September 1984 he attended the 2nd Congress of Delegates of the Vietnam Mining Association. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 47)

Trần Đại [TRAANF DAIJ]

*Deputy Head of the Engineering Department, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article on improved ship repair facilities in the provinces of the Mekong River Delta appeared in the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 15 Nov 84 p 3)

Nguyễn Văn Đán [NGUYEENX VAWN DANF], Professor

Vice Minister of Public Health; his article "Increase Management of the Market in Curative Medicines" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI DUOC HOC Oct 84 p 4)

Nay Y Điăk [NAY Y DIAWK], Doctor

*Chairman of the Fatherland Front Committee, Dac Lac Province; he was mentioned in an article on living conditions in his province. (DOC LAP 5 Dec 84 p 1)

Triết Giang [TRIEETS GIANG]

*Member of the Standing Committee of the CPV Committee, Phu Khanh Province; his article on agricultural cooperatization in his province appeared in the cited source. (NONG NGHIEP 20 Nov 84 p 7)

Từ Giây [TUWF GIAAYS], Professor

Head of the Nutrition Institute, Ministry of Public Health; his article on the future composition of meals appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Nov 84 p 5)

Đùng Hà [ZUNGX HAF]

*Editor-in-chief of the armed forces literary magazine TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; he was appointed to the standing committee of the board of judges for a writing contest sponsored by his publication. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 140)

Bùi Duy Hàn [BUIF ZUY HANF]

*Head of the Regional Science and Technology Management Department State Science and Technology Commission; his article "Science and Technology Activities in the Mountain Provinces of Bac Bo" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 49)

Lương Hiền [LUWOW'G HIEENF]

*Chief of Engineers, 3rd Military Region; recently he participated in an Armed Forces short story contest. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 138)

Trần Hoàn [TRAANF HOAN]

Standing Member of the CPV Committee, Hanoi; *Head of the Arts and Letters Department of the CPV Committee, Hanoi; his article "The Cultural Life in the Capital" appeared in the cited source. (VAN HOA NGHE THUAT Oct 84 p 4)

Triều Huy Hùng [TRIEEUJ HUY HUNGF], *Major General

His article on national mobilization in time of war appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Duy Khương [NGUYEENX ZUY KHUOWNG]

*Deputy Head of the Science and Technology Commission, Binh Tri Thien Province; his article "The Agro-Forestry Combination in the Coastal Sandy Areas of Binh Tri Thien Province" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Nov 84 p 19)

Đào Kỳ [DAOF KYJ]

*Deputy Head of the College of Commerce; his article urging more science education appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Sep 84 p 11)

Phạm Sỹ Liêm [PHAMJ SYX LIEEM]

Standing Member of the CPV Committee, Hanoi; Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi; on 9 August 1984 he participated in a meeting with the State Science and Technology Commission. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 46)

Nguyễn Huy Liệu [NGUYEENX HUY LIEEUJ]

*Deputy Director of the Port of Hanoi; his article on improved efficiency at the Port of Hanoi appeared in the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 22 Nov 84 p 3)

Đường Xuân Nghiênn [ZUOWONG XUAAN NGHIEEN]

Secretary of the Vietnam Teachers Trade Union; on 10 November 1984 he attended a teachers conference in Hanoi. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 25 Nov 84 p 7)

Trình Nguyên [TRINHJ NGUYEEN]

Deputy Head of the Organization Department of the Council of Ministers; on 27-28 September 1984 he attended the 2nd Congress of Delegates of the Vietnam Association of Mining. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 47)

Trần Xuân Nhơn [TRAANF XUAAN NHOWN]

*Head of Seaways General Department, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article on managing the seaways sector appeared in the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 22 Nov 84 p 1)

Chu Phác [CHU PHACS], *Colonel

*Deputy Chief of the Schools Department, General Staff; recently he participated in an Armed Forces short story contest. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 138)

Nguyễn Thiên Phúc [NGUYEENX THIEENJ PHUCS]

*Chairman of the Science and Technology Federation, Hanoi; his article "The Science and Technology Federation of Hanoi as a Bridge Between Science and Production" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 49)

Hoàng Phương [HOANGF PHUWOWNG], Lieutenant General

His article recalling the struggle against the French in 1945 appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 53)

Đặng Văn Qua [DAWNGJ VAWN QUA]

*Deputy Head of the Seaways General Department, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article on the use of seagoing carriers for river trade appeared in the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 22 Nov 84 p 7)

Nguyễn Trọng Quỳnh [NGUYEENX TRONGJ QUYNHF], *Colonel

*Deputy Head of the Ground Forces School; recently he participated in an Armed Forces short story contest. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 138)

Trần Văn Quỳnh [TRAANF VAWN QUYNHF]

*Head of the College of Mining; on 27-28 September 1984 he attended the 2nd Congress of Delegates of the Vietnam Association of Mining. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 47)

Phạm Song [PHAMJ SONG]

*Vice Minister of Public Health; his article of advice to youths appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Sep 84 p 14)

Mai Sơn [MAI SOWN], *Colonel

His article on terrain problems in Vietnam appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 84 p 33)

Nguyễn Duy Sơn [NGUYEENX ZUY SOWN]

*Deputy Head of the Science and Technology Department, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article "Standardization in Capital Construction for Transportation and Communications" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Nov 84 p 15)

Phạm Hồng Sơn [PHAMJ HOONGF SOWN], Lieutenant General

His article on terrain problems in Vietnam appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Nov 84 p 33)

Lê Tâm [LEE TAAM]

Member of the State Science and Technology Commission; former Head of the State Metrology Department; his article "The New Definition of the Meter" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 49)

Nguyễn Đình Thạch [NGUYEENX DINHF THACHJ], Lieutenant Colonel

His article on the employment of artillery against PRC forces appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 63)

Trần Thế Thông [TRAANF THEES THOONG], Professor

Head of the Agricultural Science Institute of Nam Bo, Ministry of Agriculture; his article on introducing new techniques for farming in southern Vietnam appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Nov 84 p 11)

Phan Hồng Thực [PHAN HOONGF THUWCJ]

*Chairman of the Science and Technology Commission, Hoang Lien Son Province; his article "Some Aspects of Science and Technology Management in Hoang Lien Son" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC Oct 84 p 49)

Khuất Duy Tiến [KHUAATS ZUY TIEENS], *Colonel

Commander of the Tay Nguyen Corps; recently he provided guidance at a short story seminar sponsored by his corps. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 144)

Hà Học Trạc [HAF HOCJ TRACJ]

Head of the Hanoi Polytechnic College; in May 1984 he attended a conference of colleges of industrial technology. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Sep 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Ngọc Trân [NGUYEENX NGOCJ TRAAN]

Vice Chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission; in May 1984 he attended a conference of colleges of industrial technology. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Sep 84 p 1)

Ngô Gia Trúc [NGOO GIA TRUCS], Professor

Head of the Drug Preparation Department, Ministry of Public Health; his article on the 1984-85 pharmaceuticals plan appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI DUOC HOC Oct 84 p 7)

Trình Văn Tự [TRINH VAWN TUWJ]

Vice Minister of Mines and Coal; in May 1984 he attended a conference of colleges of industrial technology. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Sep 84 p 1)

Bùi Cát Vũ [BUIF CATS VUX], *Major General

Deputy Commander, 7th Military Region; recently he participated in an Armed Forces short story contest. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 84 p 138)

Nguyễn Quang Xuyên [NGUYEENX QUANG XUYEEN], Catholic Priest

*Vice Chairman of the Fatherland Front Committee, Quang Nam-Danang Province; his article on the compatibility of religion and daily life appeared in the cited source. (NGUOI CONG GIAO VIET NAM 9 Dec 84 p 4)

CSO: 4209/156

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Huỳnh Thúc Cấn [HUYNH THUCS CAANR], *Lieutenant Colonel

His article "National Defense and Military Training in Bulgarian Schools" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Nov 84 p 21)

Hữu Diệp [HUWUX ZIEEPJ], *Colonel

His article recalling events in the air defense of Ha Tinh City during 1965 appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Dec 84 p 3)

Đào Duyên [DAOF ZUYEEN], Colonel

Of the Cadre Department, Ministry of National Defense; his article "Strengthen and Improve the Quality of Military Instructors in Colleges" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Nov 84 p 9)

Nguyễn Xuân Đào [NGUYEENX XUAAN DAOF]

*Deputy Head of the Communications and Transportation Science and Technology Institute; his article on surfacing for roadways appeared in the cited source. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI Aug 84 p 26)

Trần Độ [TRAANF DOOJ]

Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; Chairman of the Culture Committee of the National Assembly; his article "Culture and Youth" appeared in the cited source. (THANH NIEN Nov 84 p 1)

Trần Văn Đước [TRAANF VAWN DUWOWCJ], *Lieutenant Colonel

*Commander of the Pharmaceuticals Enterprise, Rear Services Department, 9th Military Region; his biographic sketch appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 19 Dec 84 p 3)

Nguyễn Anh Hoài [NGUYEENX ANH HOAIF]

*Head of the Marxism-Leninism Education Department, Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education; his article "Continue the Movement 'Strengthen Education in Revolutionary Virtues' in School Year 1984-85 and the Years to Come" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Oct 84 p 17)

Phan Văn Khải [PHAN VAWN KHAIR]

Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; Acting Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; his article "A City That Is Moving Ahead Strongly" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 1 Jan 85 p 2)

Joàng Thế Lâm [HOANGF THEES LAAM], *Lieutenant Colonel

*Head of Military Training, Hanoi University; his article "Military Training at Hanoi University" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Nov 84 p 15)

Phan Thanh Liêm [PHAN THANH LIEEM]

*Member [sic] of the Central Committee of the CPV; *Director of Machine Tool Manufacturing Factory No 1; his article "An Enterprise That Has Achieved Collective Mastery" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 1 Jan 85 p 2)

Đỗ Mười [DOOX MUWOWIF]

Member of the Political Bureau of the CPV; Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers; on 2 January 1985 he attended inaugural ceremonies of the Bim Son Cement Factory. (NHAN DAN 3 Jan 85 p 1)

[Đỗ] Xuân Oanh [DOOX XUAAN OANH]

Secretary General of the Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace; on 18 December 1984 he attended the departure of a delegation of the World Peace Council. (NHAN DAN 19 Dec 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Tiên Phong [NGUYEENX TIEEN PHONG]

Deputy Head of the Civil Proselytizing Department of the CPV Central Committee; his article "Lessons of the Three Readiness Movement" appeared in the cited source. (THANH NIEN Nov 84 p 5)

Nguyễn Danh Phương [NGUYEENX ZANH PHUWOWNG], *Colonel

Commander of the 3rd Group; he was mentioned in an article about his unit. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 26 Dec 84 p 2)

Nguyễn Duy Quý [NGUYEENX ZUY QUYS]

Deputy Head of Hanoi University; his article "Military Education Is Part of Communist Education" appeared in the cited source. (DAI HOC VA TRUNG HOC CHUYEN NGHIEP Nov 84 p 11)

Hồ Lộc Sinh [HOOF LOOCJ SINHS], deceased

Born on 29 July 1911 at Quoi Thien Village, Vung Liem District, Cuu Long Province; Member of the CPV; former Deputy Director of the Nam Bo Budget Service; former Deputy Director of the Finance Service, Ministry of Heavy Industry; he was in retirement and residing in Ho Chi Minh City at the time of his death on 18 October 1984. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 19 Oct 84 p 4)

Lương Soạn [LUWOWNG SOANJ], *Major General

Acting Head of the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum and *Commander of the Mausoleum Guard Force; recently he was present when the people of Lam Dong Province presented gifts to the mausoleum. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Dec 84 p 1)

Hồ Thị Kim Thanh [HOOF THIJ KIM THANH]

*Secretary of the CPV Committee, Nui Thanh District, Quang Nam-Danang Province; her article "A District With Great Vitality" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 1 Jan 85 p 2)

Lý Thảo² [LYS THAOR], Colonel, deceased

Born in 1927 at Hai Dinh City, Hai Lang District, Binh Tri Thien Province; Deputy Commander of the 3rd Navy Region; Member of the CPV; he died following an illness on 22 December 1984 at the 17th Military Hospital, 5th Military Region. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 26 Dec 84 p 4)

Huỳnh Việt Thắng [HUYNHF VIEETJ THAWNGS]

Associate Justice of the Supreme People's Court; on 18 December 1984 he presided at the conclusion of the trial of five spies in Ho Chi Minh City. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 19 Dec 84 p 1)

Hà Kiến Thiết [HAF KIEENS THIEETS], Colonel

His article on the Signal Forces appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 25 Dec 84 p 2)

Phan Vĩ Thủy² [PHAN VIJ THUYR]

*Acting Head of the Communications and Transportation Science and Technology Institute, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article "Direction of Science and Technology Technology and Organization Building in the Communications and Transportation Science and Technology Institute" appeared in the cited source. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI Aug 84 p 1)

Phan Ngọc Tường [PHAN NGOCJ TUWOWNGF]

Alternate Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; Minister of Building; on 2 January 1985 he attended inaugural ceremonies at the Bim Son Cement Factory. (NHAN DAN 3 Jan 85 p 1)

Nguyễn Ung [NGUYEENX UNGS], deceased

Born on 10 April 1927 at Hoa Loc Village, Hau Lao District, Thanh Hoa Province; Member of the CPV; former Head of the Planning Department, Ministry of Building; Head of the Team of Construction Specialists in Laos; he died following an illness at the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Hospital. (NHAN DAN 2 Jan 85 p 4)

CSO: 4209/209

PUBLICATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF 'TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,' NO 11, 1984

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Nov 84

[Text] Some Matters Regarding the Preparation of the Country to Resist
Aggression and a War Time Army Mobilization (pp 1-14)
(Article by Major General Trieu Huy Hung) [to be published in
JPRS series]

Ha Nam Ninh and the Task of Winning Victory over the Enemy's Wide-Ranging
War of Sabotage (pp 15-23)
(Article by Nguyen Van An)[to be published in JPRS series]

The Political Agency Within the New Mechanism by Which the Party Leads
the Army (pp 24-32)
(Article by Senior General Dang The Chuong)[to be published in
JPRS series]

Studies

Some Matters Regarding the Military Geography of Vietnam (pp 33-46)
(Article by Lieutenant General Pham Hong Son and Senior Colonel
Mai Son)

Exchange of Experiences

Experiences in Army Mobilization Exercises (pp 47-54)
(Article by Le Huy Ngo)[to be published in JPRS series]

Some Experiences in Teaching, Cultivating and Displaying the Working Class
Character and Army Traditions Among Special Operations Troops (pp 55-61)
(Article by Senior Colonel Do Cong Cuong)[to be published in
JPRS series]

Historical Military Materials

How the Kings of Vietnam Dealt with China's Policy of Expansion and Border
Intrusions (p 62)
(Article by Hai Duong)

7809

CSO: 4209/145

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

MARCH 4 1985